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1. Introduction  
This study focuses on the following questions: Are bank capital decisions associated with creditor 
rights? Is the relationship between creditor rights and capital decisions identical for conventional banks 
and Islamic banks? The literature has focused on the link between creditor rights and bank lending 
decisions such as loan spreads and maturities (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; González, 
2016), ownership structure of international syndicated loans (Esty and Megginson, 2003), and multiple 
lending decisions (Djankov et al. 2006; Bennardo et al. 2015). However, research on whether creditor 
rights are associated with bank financing (capital) decisions is still scarce.  
Better protection of creditors is expected to reduce firm leverage because, under such 
circumstances, shareholders worry more about loss of control in case of distress (Acharya et al. 2011; 
Cho et al. 2014). There is limited evidence to suggest that such findings also hold for banks. For example, 
Houston et al. (2010) show that to attract depositors in environments where creditor rights are stronger, 
banks set higher capital ratios. However, their study mainly focuses on developed countries and examines 
the effect of creditor rights on bank risk-taking while only referring to capital ratios in their robustness 
tests. Furthermore, the question as to whether or not Islamic banks behave similarly to conventional 
banks from this perspective remains open. 
In this paper, we investigate whether creditor rights are significantly associated with the capital 
ratios of conventional and Islamic banks across a sample of (mainly) developing countries. Specifically, 
we focus on the differences between the two bank types. For conventional banks, in the presence of a 
highly protective environment for creditors, bank managers are expected to avoid excessive reliance on 
deposit-debt financing and by extension any corresponding increase in leverage. In contrast, under the 
profit and loss sharing principle (PLS) imposed by Sharia'a law, the depositors of Islamic banks are not 
expected to be concerned about creditor rights. Such depositors, referred to as investment account holders 
(IAHs), share potential losses with shareholders, and thus their capital is not at stake. Under these 
circumstances, we predict that creditor rights will have a limited effect on Islamic banks’ capital decisions 
while the opposite should be observed for conventional banks.  
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To empirically assess the impact of creditor rights on conventional and Islamic banks’ capital 
decisions, we use a sample of 680 conventional banks and 113 Islamic banks operating in 24 countries 
from 1999 to 2013. We find that creditor rights are positively associated with the capital ratios of 
conventional banks but not with those of Islamic banks.  
A deeper investigation shows that, consistent with the view that core capital1 is a better signalling 
mechanism than the capital adequacy ratio (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013; Anginer et al., 2014; Bitar et al. 
2016), such a relationship essentially holds for conventional banks’ core capital but remains insignificant 
for the core capital of Islamic banks. Moreover, a detailed breakdown of the components of creditor rights 
shows that giving secured creditors priority over other creditors as well as giving them the authority to 
replace the existing management in case of distress play an important role in banks’ decisions to hold 
more capital. Further, the results show that the positive association between creditor rights and capital for 
conventional banks is stronger after the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. This association is also more 
pronounced for mature banks, for banks in common law countries, for banks in countries with a higher 
income, for banks in countries with a strong institutional environment and a sound governance. However, 
a link between creditor rights and bank capital is always absent for Islamic banks.  
Our study also examines whether Islamic banks react differently to creditor rights depending on (a) 
the competitiveness of the banking market and (b) the proportion of Muslim borrowers within the given 
country. Islamic banks with stronger market power might charge higher rates2 to Muslim clients 
(borrowers) for offering Sharia’a compliant products (Weill, 2011). These clients might be willing to pay 
more than less religious Muslim clients to make sure that the products they receive are compliant with 
Islamic law (Weill, 2011; Abedifar et al., 2013). In addition, religious IAHs, are expected to be willing to 
share profits and losses with the bank and thus do not require any protection of their deposits. In contrast, 
clients who are not religious Muslims might not be willing to pay more to borrow from Islamic banks 
than from conventional banks, which could weaken the demand for Islamic banks’ products and reduce 
their attractiveness. In addition, more costly loans lead to riskier investments and more volatile returns 
(Turk-Ariss, 2010a) and IAHs who are not religious Muslims are expected to be more sensitive to return 
rates and default risk than more religious ones. Hence, they might behave similarly to depositors of 
                                                          
1 Core capital is the bank’s Tier1 capital and represents a bank’s financial strength from a regulatory perspective. Core capital is 
primarily composed of common stock, retained earnings and non-cumulative preferred stocks.  
2 Under Islamic law, Islamic banks are prohibited from charging interest rates on their Sharia’a compliant products. Instead they 
use markups or fee based financing techniques. For instance, in a Murabaha contract, Islamic banks arrange for the products to 
be purchased and then sell them to clients with a pre-agreed profit margin (or rates). Bitar et al. (2017) highlight that Murabaha 
contracts constitute 80% of Islamic banks’ financing activities.  
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conventional banks. Consequently, stronger protection of creditors might put pressure on Islamic banks to 
hold higher capital ratios to protect IAHs who are not religious Muslims, preserve their confidence and 
thus reduce the withdrawal risk. We find compelling evidence that supports this view.  
Our study contributes to the literature on both conventional and Islamic banking in at least three 
important ways. First, we highlight the existence of a strong positive influence of creditor rights on the 
capital decisions of conventional banks but not on those of Islamic banks. Nevertheless, we also find that 
Islamic banks behave similarly to conventional banks in predominantly non-Muslim countries with less 
competitive banking markets. This could provide regulators and policy makers with an additional tool to 
create more favorable corporate and institutional conditions to implement the Basel III accords on bank 
prudential regulation in a successful way. Second, we show that other factors such as the country’s 
income, the country’s legal origins, bank age, and the country’s economic fluctuations have a significant 
influence on conventional banks’ capital decisions but not on those of Islamic banks. Third, we add to the 
comparative literature on conventional and Islamic banks (Beck et al. 2013; Abedifar et al. 2013; Mollah 
and Zaman, 2015, Bitar et al., 2017), by exploring the determinants of bank capital decisions, and we find 
compelling evidence of dissimilarities between the two bank types.   
Overall, our results are robust to alternative estimation techniques, including additional control 
variables, an instrumental variables approach (IV) and a Heckman estimation technique to control for 
endogeneity and selection bias, and a propensity score matching (PSM) technique to reduce bias in the 
sample size.         
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature and describes 
the research focus. Section 3 describes the sample, the variables and the empirical model. Section 4 
presents the main results. Section 5 examines the impact of bank market power and religion. Section 6 
reports the robustness tests and some further investigations. Section 8 concludes.  
2. Related literature and research focus 
While the literature provides abundant evidence on the importance of creditor rights in influencing 
bank and firm risk taking (Houston et al. 2010; Acharya et al. 2011; Jayaraman and Thakor, 2013) and 
lending decisions (Djankov et al. 2006; Qian and Strahan, 2007; González, 2016), few empirical studies 
investigate the impact of creditor rights on capital ratios.  
In the corporate finance literature, Acharya et al. (2011) and Cho et al. (2014) show that firms in 
countries with stronger creditor rights tend to rely less on leverage (especially long-term debt), suggesting 
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that firm managers and shareholders are less willing to substitute safe capital (such as equity) with risky 
capital (such as long term debt). Qian and Strahan (2007) find that better protection of creditors facilitates 
firm access to longer maturity borrowing and at lower interest rates. Thus, lenders are more confident that 
they will be able to confiscate the assets, or at least threaten to do so, in case of failure. Daher (2017) also 
finds that the existence of strong legal enforcement and creditor protection reduces the negative effect of 
covenant violation on firms’ debt issuance.  
In the banking literature, Houston et al. (2010) show that stronger creditor rights are associated with 
higher capital ratios for conventional banks in developed countries, indicating that to attract depositors in 
the presence of a high protective environment for creditors, banks issue more equity capital. To increase 
their investments, banks need to attract more depositors by signalling a credible monitoring incentive. 
According to the authors, one way of indicating credible bank monitoring and less risky behavior is 
through holding more equity capital. By holding higher capital buffers, banks are committing to a certain 
level of leverage without using depositors’ money. Such behavior reflects the “more skin in the game” 
policy documented by Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013).   
In contrast to conventional banks, the funding structure of Islamic banks – which has to be Sharia’a 
compliant – is based on three main sources: capital, demand deposits and profit-loss sharing investment 
accounts. Islamic banks’ depositors are considered more like IAHs than depositors. Through the use of 
restricted and unrestricted investment accounts, depositors of Islamic banks are expected to accept risks 
and to share profits and losses with bank shareholders. Their deposit returns are dependent on the 
outcome of the bank’s investments and therefore deposit insurance and other forms of creditors’ 
protection are prohibited because they contradict the PLS concept. Accordingly, for Islamic banks, we 
would not expect a link between creditor rights and bank capital.  
However, the above argument is based on an idealized conceptualization of the Islamic banking 
sector. In practice, there may be some association between creditor rights and Islamic banks’ capital 
ratios, depending on banks’ market power and the size of the Muslim population in the given country. 
Weill (2011) argues that religious Muslim borrowers might exhibit a more inelastic demand than other 
borrowers, as they are driven by loyalty and respect for Sharia’a law. El-Gamal (2007) explains that 
additional charges for offering Sharia’a products are considered as the “cost of being Muslim” and 
Abedifar et al. (2013) refer to the additional cost as the price of offering Sharia’a compliant products. On 
the depositors’ side, in predominantly Muslim countries, IAHs accept the risk of losses and tend to be 
loyal to their banks. This could reduce the risk of withdrawal (Abedifar et al., 2013), regardless of the 
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return rate on their deposits. Therefore, the role of capital as a monitoring mechanism is expected to be 
ineffective because creditors are treated as pure investors. As a result, creditor rights are expected to have 
a limited effect on Islamic banks’ capital ratios in predominantly Muslim countries, especially if those 
countries have banking sectors with strong market power. 
In contrast, clients who are not religious Muslims might be more sensitive to borrowing costs. In 
this case, the competitiveness of Sharia’a compliant products could be lower. One important feature of 
Islamic banks is their reliance on debt-like financing techniques such as Murabaha and Ijara. For 
instance, Beck et al. (2013) find that Islamic banks have a larger involvement in traditional intermediation 
activities. Turk-Ariss (2010a) also finds that Islamic banks with higher market power allocate a greater 
share of their assets to finance loans compared to conventional banks, yielding a greater exposure to 
credit risk. IAHs who are not religious Muslims are expected to be more sensitive to return rates and 
credit risk. Accordingly, they might react similarly to depositors of conventional banks. Thus, stronger 
creditor protection might put pressure on Islamic banks to hold higher capital ratios, as a signalling 
mechanism to preserve the confidence of IAHs who are not religious Muslims and reduce the withdrawal 
risk. As a result, creditor rights are expected to have a positive effect on Islamic banks’ capital ratios in 
predominately non-Muslim countries, especially if those countries have banking sectors with strong 
market power. 
3. Sample and methodology       
3.1. Sample construction and data sources 
The data used to construct our capital ratios and other bank-level characteristics are collected from 
the BankScope database. For each bank in the sample, we retrieve annual data from 1999 to 2013. Our 
initial sample includes banks from 33 countries.   
The key independent variable in our investigation is the creditor rights’ index of Djankov et al. 
(2007). Following Cho et al. (2014), we define the index as the sum of four legal measures, i.e. no 
automatic stay, secured creditor paid first, restrictions on reorganization, and no management stay, each 
of which receives a value of one if a country’s regulations provide that specific type of protection, and 
zero otherwise. More specifically, no automatic stay equals one if secured creditors are able to gain 
possession of assets after the petition for reorganization is approved. Secured creditor paid first equals 
one if secured creditors are given absolute priority to claims during bankruptcy over other creditors such 
as government or workers. Restrictions on reorganization equals one if debtors cannot file for a 
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reorganization plan without the creditors’ consent. Finally, no management stay equals one if either the 
creditors or the court can change the incumbent management during the reorganization, and zero if the 
management during reorganization has the power to remain in charge. The aggregate creditor rights’ 
index therefore ranges from zero to four with a higher value indicating stronger creditor protection. 
We exclude countries such as Bahrain, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Gambia, Iraq, Palestinian 
territories, Philippines, Qatar, and Sudan because they have no available data on the creditor rights’ 
index. We also exclude banks if they do not have at least 3 continuous observations and banks with 
negative capital ratios. Our final sample consists of 793 banks (including 113 Islamic banks) operating in 
24 countries. 
Macroeconomic data such as GDP growth, inflation, and oil and mineral rents are obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Financial development and institutional variables 
are obtained from various sources, such as the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 
Djankov et al. (2007), the CIA’s World Fact Book, and the World Values Surveys (WVS).  
3.2. Variables and empirical model 
We follow Mollah and Zaman (2015) and use random-effect, Generalized Least Squares (GLS) 
regressions. We use the GLS technique for two reasons. First, regression models such as OLS ignore the 
panel structure of our data. Second, the creditor rights’ index and the Islamic bank dummy are time-
invariant and cannot be estimated using a fixed-effects methodology. Accordingly, we employ the 
following regression models: 
CAPijt = α + β1 × CRj + β2 × Bank_deterijt−1 + β3 × Macro_deterjt + ∑ βt × YFEt
T
T=1
+ εit           (1) 
CAPijt = α + β1 × CRj + β2 × Islamici + β3 × CRj × Islamici + β4 × Bank_deterijt−1 + β5 × Macro_deterjt
+ ∑ βt × YFEt
T
T=1
+ εit                                                                                                                  (2) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the bank capital adequacy ratio (CAP) for bank i in country j during year t. It is defined 
as the sum of Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital divided by risk weighted assets and off-balance sheet exposures. 
We also use core capital ratio defined as Tier1 capital divided by risk weighted assets and off-balance 
sheet exposures. CRjt is the aforementioned index of creditor rights (CR) and measures the powers of 
secured creditors in cases of default.  
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𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 represents the bank-level determinants of capital ratios identified by the 
traditional banking and corporate finance literature, i.e. logarithm of total assets (size), return on average 
assets (profitability), loans to assets (diversification), liquid assets to deposits and short term funding 
(liquidity), and fixed assets to assets (tangibility). Bank-level independent variables are lagged by one 
year for two reasons. First, lagged independent variables might reduce endogeneity. Second, these 
variables might take more than one year to show any pronounced effect. All bank-level variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and the 99% levels to mitigate the effect of outliers. 
𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜_𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡 controls for differences in economic conditions and captures the impact of 
macroeconomic variables on bank capital ratios. It includes GDP growth rate (GDP growth), inflation 
rate (inflation), and natural resources, i.e. oil rent (oil) and mineral rent (mineral). We also use The World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI) to capture the role of the institutional environment in 
shaping the financial development in each country.  
𝑌𝐹𝐸𝑡 are the year fixed effects and 𝑖𝑡 is a white-noise error term assumed to be normally 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance, 𝑖𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2).  
An Islamic bank dummy (Islamic) and an interaction term between the Islamic bank dummy and 
the creditor rights’ index (Islamic × creditor rights) are included in Eq. (2). Islamic equals one if the bank 
is an Islamic bank and zero otherwise.  
Finally, we follow Beck et al. (2013) and Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) and cluster at the 
bank level, instead of the country level, for two reasons. First, some countries have a much larger number 
of observations than other countries in the sample. Second, we have twenty-four countries. Therefore, 
clustering at the country level might create biased results. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the 24 countries for the capital adequacy ratio, the core 
capital ratio (Tier 1 capital), the creditor rights’ index, the bank-level variables, and the country-level 
control variables. The numbers suggest a large cross-country variation in capital ratios. For instance, the 
capital adequacy ratio ranges from a minimum of 11.84% in Bangladesh to a maximum of 29.74% in 
Yemen. Creditor rights’ scores also vary substantially across countries. We find that Kenya, Lebanon and 
the United Kingdom rank at the top of the creditor rights’ index whereas Senegal, Tunisia, and Yemen 
rank at the bottom. The macroeconomic control variables, namely GDP growth, inflation, oil and mineral 
rents, also vary widely across countries, indicating that it is likely to be important to control for these 
variables in our regressions. Finally, Table A.1 in Appendix A presents the number of conventional and 
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Islamic banks in each country while Table A.2 presents the correlation matrix of the variables that enter 
our regressions. The sample is dominated by banks from the United Kingdom for conventional banks and 
Malaysia for Islamic banks. We also notice that for the studied period, the average value of the 
percentage of available observations (N obs. %) is rather low, at just 59.4% for conventional banks and 
57.1% for Islamic ones. As for the correlation matrix, it does not show any major multicollinearity 
problems between our exogenous variables. With the exception of the high correlation between the two 
capital ratio measures, the correlation coefficients between the exogenous variables are less than the 
critical threshold of 0.6.3 VIF values range between 1 and 1.5, considerably below the critical value of 10 
(Bennouri et al. 2018).4    
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
4. Main findings  
We begin by illustrating the unconditional association between creditor rights and bank regulatory 
capital ratios, i.e. capital adequacy ratio and core capital ratio, in Table 2. Fig. 1 plots the mean regulatory 
capital ratios for five groups of countries classified by creditor rights’ scores (0 to 4), as reported in Table 
2. The graph shows that regulatory capital ratios exhibit an increasing pattern as a function of increasing 
creditor rights. The univariate analysis of variance (F) test in Table 2 shows that the variation between 
groups defined by creditors’ rights index is significant. 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
We now report the impact of creditor rights on bank capital adequacy ratios for the sample of 
conventional banks, the sample of Islamic banks and for the full sample. Results are reported in Table 3. 
The Wald Chi2 tests are highly significant for all models and the R-squared values are relatively high and 
similar to previous literature (Houston et al. 2010; Cho et al. 2014). Creditor rights are positively 
                                                          
3 The Pearson correlation matrix yields relatively low coefficients between creditor rights and capital ratios. This low correlation 
is probably due to the fact that Pearson’s correlation performs better with continuous variables than categorical variables. To 
overcome this issue, we also generate a Spearman correlation matrix and indeed, we notice an increase in the correlation 
coefficients between the two variables. Research in corporate finance provides many examples of a very weak correlation 
between categorical and continuous variables when the Pearson method is used (see for example Gonzalez, 2016; Bennouri et 
al., 2018). 
4 Value inflation factors or VIFs are used to indicate whether multicollinearity exists between different regressors. High VIFs 
are considered as a sign of a multicollinearity problem in a regression.   
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associated with the capital ratios of conventional banks (β1 is positive and significant in Models 1 and 2) 
but not with those of Islamic banks (Model 6). In Model 2, we observe that a one-standard deviation 
increase in creditor rights (1.16) is associated with an increase in conventional banks’ capital adequacy of 
0.484 (=0.417*1.16) or 2.41% (=0.484/20.07; statistically significant at p < 5%). Moreover, our findings 
for the full sample in Models 9 and 10 confirm both the positive impact of creditor rights on the capital 
adequacy ratios of conventional banks (β1 is positive and significant) and the lack of an association for 
Islamic banks ((β1+β3), shown in Panel B, is, in general, not statistically significant). Overall, our results 
indicate that, in the presence of stronger creditor rights, conventional banks need to hold more capital 
(Models 1 and 2), which we hypothesize is due to the desire to gain the confidence of depositors. This 
does not apply to Islamic banks. Given that depositors of Islamic banks agree to share profits and bear 
losses when they occur, any form of creditor protection to gain depositors’ confidence should be 
irrelevant under Sharia’a law.   
Next, we ask whether the positive impact of creditor rights on capital is the same for bank core 
capital ratios. Depositors and regulators view core capital as the most reliable component in the capital 
adequacy ratio (Arnold et al. 2012; Bitar et al. 2018). In addition, market participants refer to Tier 1 
capital as the component that is available to absorb losses in situations of financial distress (Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. 2013; Anginer et al. 2014). The results, also reported in Table 3, confirm our expectations for 
conventional banks both in the separate sample (Models 3 and 4) and the full sample (Models 11 and 12). 
In Model 4, we observe that a one-standard deviation increase in creditor rights (1.16) is associated with 
an increase in conventional banks’ core capital of 0.63 (=0.547*1.16) or 3.84% (=0.547/16.54; 
statistically significant at p < 1%). For the full sample (Model 12), the equivalent increase in the core 
capital of conventional banks is 0.654 (=0.564*1.16) or 3.81% (=0.654/17.18; statistically significant at p 
< 1%). Thus in an institutional environment that is characterised by stronger creditor protection, banks 
tend to hold higher capital ratios in the form of core capital. More capital may lead to stronger bank 
monitoring incentives and this, in turn, improves depositors’ and regulators’ confidence in bank solvency. 
Although Islamic banks rely more on core capital5 than do their conventional counterparts, the results 
when using core capital as the dependent variable remain insignificant (Panel A, Models 7 and 8, and 
Panel B, Models 11 and 12).  
 [Insert Table 3 around here] 
                                                          
5 Islamic banks are less capable of raising Tier 2 capital because Sharia’a law prohibits dealing with debt instruments such as 
hybrid capital and subordinated debt (e.g. junior security and subordinated loans) as they require interest payments. 
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With regards to bank-level control variables, we find a negative and significant association between 
size and capital ratios for the two bank types, possibly reflecting the argument of Beck et al. (2013) and 
Abedifar et al. (2013) that larger banks are more experienced and have a superior reputation than smaller 
ones. In addition, large banks benefit from diversification and economy of scales, have lower bankruptcy 
costs and better access to capital markets. Finally, large Islamic banks have a more privileged position 
with regard to accessing Sharia’a compliant debt instruments and levering the use of investment 
accounts; thus, they rely less on capital. As for profitability, we find a positive and significant relationship 
with capital ratios, possibly because banks in developing countries rely more on their retained earnings, 
especially if the economic and financial environment is not well developed. As a result, banks in these 
countries are more prone to information asymmetry and transaction costs and hence raising either debt or 
equity might be more expensive. The coefficient estimate of the loans-to-assets ratio shows a negative 
association with capital ratios but only for conventional banks, suggesting that banks with important loan 
portfolios are less exposed to credit risk, and thus there is no need for them to hold high capital buffers. 
Finally, the coefficient estimate for tangibility shows a positive and significant effect on bank capital 
ratios although the results are not significant in all models. This finding could reflect the fact that a higher 
proportion of tangible assets in the bank balance sheet reduces moral hazard problems by allowing banks 
to have a clearer view of the allocation of their resources. This implies that the cost of issuing equity is 
expected to be lower than the cost of raising debt when information asymmetry is neglected.  
As for country-level control variables, we find that the governance indicator has a positive impact 
on bank capital adequacy and core capital for both bank types. Therefore, in the presence of a strong 
institutional environment in terms of rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption, banks are 
more capable of raising equity than debt. We also find that inflation is negatively associated with capital 
ratios for both bank types, possibly reflecting the tax shield benefit of debt and its positive association 
with bank leverage. Finally, we show that banks operating in countries with higher oil and mineral rents 
have higher capital ratios. Such results indicate that banks can benefit from the prices of natural resources 
to increase their equity base in the form of retained earnings and/or reserves to protect against future 
changes in economic conditions (political instability, oil price volatility, etc.).   
5. The impact of bank market power and religion  
We now investigate how bank market power and religion influence the link between creditor rights 
and capital ratios for conventional and Islamic banks. The literature often refers to the competition-
stability hypothesis and the competition-fragility hypothesis to examine the impact of market power on 
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bank stability.6 As for the impact of market power on bank capital ratios, the literature is not conclusive. 
Turk-Ariss (2010a, b) and Forssbaeck (2015) provide evidence that market power increases bank stability 
by making banks hold higher capital ratios. In contrast, Allen et al. (2011) and Schaeck and Cihák (2012, 
2014) find that competition improves bank stability by incentivising banks to hold higher capital ratios. 
Both sides of the literature conclude that holding a sufficient level of bank capital is an important tool for 
maintaining bank incentives to monitor by internalising the cost of defaulting. These results concur with 
the findings of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) on the important role of bank capital.  
In this section, we look at the effect of the interaction between market power and creditor rights on 
bank capital ratios in a dual market where conventional and Islamic banks compete, an issue that has not 
been addressed in the comparative literature between the two bank types. In conventional banking, the 
presence of strong creditor rights appears to be driving banks to hold higher capital ratios as a way of 
gaining depositors’ confidence. We now ask whether strong market power can influence bank managers’ 
capital decisions in countries with dual banking systems.  
To do this, we introduce the Lerner index to Eqs. (1)–(2) as well as the interaction term between 
creditor rights and the Lerner index (Creditor rights×Lerner). The Lerner index is commonly used in the 
banking literature (Turk-Ariss 2010a, b; Weill, 2011; Meslier et al. 2017). It is defined as the difference 
between the price of financial products and their marginal cost, divided by the price. Banks are usually 
able to set a price that is higher than the marginal cost in less competitive markets. As a result, a higher 
value of the Lerner index indicates higher market power and less competitive conditions (see Appendix B 
for a more detailed presentation of the calculation of the Lerner index).  
Results are presented in Table 4 for the capital adequacy ratio and the core capital ratio. Panel A 
examines the effect of the interaction term between the Lerner index and creditor rights on capital ratios 
for the two bank types. Panel B examines the relationship between bank capital and creditor rights in 
countries with strong market power at different values of the Lerner index (25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th 
percentiles).7 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
                                                          
6 For more details on the two hypotheses, see Turk-Ariss (2010b). 
7 We performed an F-test (Wald) for the degree of significance between the (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) coefficients of creditor rights×Lerner 
index for the different quantiles. Significant differences were observed between the lower and the upper quantiles of the 
interaction coefficients for Islamic banks while these differences appeared to be marginal or insignificant for conventional banks.  
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The results in Panel A show that the market power has no influence on the link between creditor 
rights and the capital ratios of conventional banks (Models 1 to 4). The results in Panel B suggest that the 
association between creditor rights and capital ratios remains positive in countries with strong market 
power ((β1+β3) is statistically significant). 
As for Islamic banks, the interaction term between creditor rights and the Lerner index shows a 
positive and significant impact at the 1% level on both the capital adequacy ratio and the core capital ratio 
(Panel A, Models 5 to 9). In Panel B, the results show that high market power alters the relationship 
between creditor rights and capital ratios (which was insignificant in the baseline model), resulting in a 
positive effect on capital ratios of Islamic banks ((𝛽1 + 𝛽3) is statistically significant). In other words, in 
an environment with strong market power, a more protective environment for creditor rights seems to put 
pressure on Islamic banks to hold higher capital ratios. 
Our results so far suggest that creditor rights are positively associated with the capital ratios of 
Islamic and conventional banks in countries with strong market power. We now ask whether this finding 
holds across countries with different proportions of Muslim inhabitants. In predominantly non-Muslim 
countries, we expect IAHs (who are less likely to be religious Muslims) to react in a similar way to 
depositors of conventional banks. In these countries, regulatory authorities such as the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) and the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) might put more pressure on Islamic banks to support IAHs and treat their accounts as Sharia’a 
compliant substitutes for conventional banks’ deposits (IFSB, 2011). In doing so, IAHs would no longer 
be treated like investors but more like depositors. As a result, Islamic banks might tend to hold higher 
capital ratios as a signalling and monitoring mechanism to preserve the confidence of IAHs who are not 
religious Muslims and reduce withdrawal risk.  
Accordingly, we examine whether the effect of the interaction between creditor rights and Lerner 
index on capital ratios differs according to the size of the Muslim population. We follow Mollah et al. 
(2016) and split our sample between predominantly Muslim countries (Muslim population > the upper 
quantile of the total population across all countries) and predominantly non-Muslim countries (Muslim 
population ≤ the upper quantile of the total population across all countries). The results are presented in 
Table 5 Panel A.1 for predominantly Muslim countries and Panel B.1 for predominantly non-Muslim 
ones. In Panels A.2 and B.2 we also compute, for different values of the Lerner index, the effect of 
creditor rights on bank capital ratios. Our findings indicate that the positive and significant impact of 
creditor rights on capital ratios becomes even stronger with higher values of the Lerner index (Panel B.2 
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Models 5 to 8). We observe that a one-standard deviation increase in creditor rights (1.16) is associated 
with an increase in Islamic banks’ capital adequacy of 3.142 (=2.709*1.16) or 13.85% (=3.142/22.69; 
statistically significant at p < 5%) at the 90th percentile of the Lerner index in predominantly non-Muslim 
countries (Panel B.2 Model 6). These results provide additional support that increased market power in 
predominantly non-Muslim countries may effectively lead Islamic banks to hold more capital when 
creditor rights are higher. 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
6. Further investigations and robustness checks 
6.1. Components of creditor rights  
To shed more light on the possible impact of creditor protection on bank capital decisions, we run 
principal component analysis (PCA) on the four elements of the creditor rights’ index – restrictions on 
reorganization, no automatic stay, secured creditor paid first, and no management stay – to examine 
which elements play the most important role. The PCA findings shows that the first component loads 
restrictions on reorganization and no automatic stay (CR_PCA1) while the second component combines 
secured creditor paid first and no management stay (CR_PCA2). We then use the two components in Eq. 
(3) as follows: 
CAPijt = α + β1 × CR_PCAj + β2 × Islamici + β3 × CR_PCAj × Islamici + β4 × Bank_deterijt−1 + β5
× Macro_deterjt + ∑ βt × YFEt
T
T=1
+ εit          (3) 
In Eq. (3), CAPijt represents bank i’s capital adequacy ratio or core capital ratio while CR_PCAj 
represents each of the two components extracted from PCA as mentioned above. The results, presented in 
Table 6 Panel A, show that restrictions on reorganization and no automatic stay are the factors that put 
more pressure on conventional banks to increase their capital ratios. We also notice that the impact is 
stronger on the core capital ratio than on the capital adequacy ratio. For the sample of Islamic banks, the 
results remain insignificant (Panel B Models 9 to 11).  
The findings for conventional banks suggest that allowing automatic liquidations of insolvent banks 
by secured creditors might prevent managers and shareholders from controlling the bank, thus giving 
greater bargaining power to creditors as opposed to managers. In addition, imposing restrictions on bank 
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management such that they cannot file for a reorganisation plan without creditors’ consent again 
prioritizes creditors’ rights above those of managers and shareholders.  
  [Insert Table 6 around here] 
6.2. Additional control variables 
First, we consider bank internal governance structure and examine whether the inclusion of board of 
directors’ characteristics and those of Sharia’a supervisory boards affects the association between 
creditor rights and bank capital decisions. The existing literature on the association between internal 
governance and capital decisions is scarce (Anginer et al., 2016; Kieschnick and Moussawi, 2018). One 
view is that a small board may not be very efficient as it might be overwhelmed with decision-making. 
Regarding large boards, arguments have been put forward in either direction, i.e., such boards may be 
either better or worse at representing shareholders’ interests, resulting in either lower or higher capital 
ratios. We argue that a board that favors shareholders’ interests at the expense of those of creditors would 
cancel out or at least weaken the effect of creditor rights, while negatively affecting bank capital ratios. 
Anginer et al. (2016) argue that shareholder interests may be served by low capitalization, since that bank 
risk can be shifted to the creditors (or IAHs in the case of Islamic banks). As for the effect of Sharia’a 
supervisory boards, Mollah and Zaman (2015) find a positive effect of Sharia’a boards on the 
performance of Islamic banks. The Sharia’a board ensures the compliance of bank investments and 
profits with Islamic principles while promoting the interests of bank shareholders. By prohibiting interest, 
speculation and doubtful investments, this supervisory role of the Sharia’a board suggests that Islamic 
banks are less prone to risk and other financial difficulties that may be experienced by conventional 
banks. This may in turn result in a less important role of bank capital. We use as proxies for effectiveness 
of the board of directors (Board size) and the Sharia’a supervisory board (Sharia’a board) the number of 
members on each board. We manually collect the data from bank websites.  
The results presented in Table 7 show that, after controlling for internal governance, the coefficients 
of the creditor rights variable remain positive but with lower significance levels for conventional banks 
and the full sample. In addition, board size is negatively associated with capital ratios for the two bank 
types implying that a larger board would promote the interest of bank owners at the expense of bank 
creditors. Finally, the Sharia’a board size variable enters the core capital regression with negative 
coefficients (Models 7 and 8). A negative association with bank capital can be attributed to the strong role 
of the Sharia’a supervisory board in advising the bank management and hence in avoiding risky and 
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speculative activities. However, no significant association is found with the capital adequacy ratio 
(Models 5 and 6). Hence, our results cannot unambiguously establish how Sharia’a board size affects 
bank capitalization.  
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
Second, we distinguish between fully-fledged Islamic banks and conventional banks with Islamic 
windows by including a dummy variable (Window) that takes on a value of one if the bank is a 
conventional bank with an Islamic window and zero otherwise. The results for the effect of creditor rights 
on bank capital ratios are presented in Table 8 and remain highly robust. 
Finally, while during our sample period banks were essentially required to follow the Basel II 
standards, we also control for potential heterogeneity in regulatory capital guidelines due to anticipation 
of Basel III. Basel III capital standards were scheduled to be implemented as of 2013. To avoid having 
mixed regulatory standards, we include a dummy variable (Basel III) that takes on a value of one if a 
country drafted (defined), published or put into force the Basel III capital adequacy guidelines before 
2014 and zero otherwise. The Basel III dummy takes the value of one either in 2013 or in both 2012 and 
2013, depending on the date of implementation or the date of issuance of instructions.8 Information on the 
presence of Basel III guidelines is collected from the 2014 Financial Stability Institute (FSI) survey from 
the BIS, the Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP), and central bank websites for the 
different countries of the sample. The results for the effect of creditor rights on bank capital ratios are 
reported in Table 8 and remain highly robust. As for the coefficient of the Basel III dummy itself, we find 
a negative association with bank capital ratios. As banks are moving forward in implementing Basel III, 
they are required to enhance the risk-weighted capital framework that proved to be miscalibrated during 
the financial crisis. Therefore, with the new reform in place banks are now required to adjust their capital 
ratios, which could explain the negative sign of Basel III. Alternatively, this negative link could be 
explained by the fact that the countries that took action earlier than others (in 2012 and 2013) could be the 
ones where capital ratios were, in general, lower than in other countries. 
      [Insert Table 8 around here] 
                                                          
8 For instance, regulatory authorities in countries such as Egypt (in 2012), Jordan (in 2013), Kenya (in 2013), Malaysia (in 2013) 
and Pakistan (in 2013) either drafted new regulations regarding the implementation of Basel III’s minimum capital requirements 
or issued instructions asking their banks to provide them with impact studies to draft and publish new guidelines to apply Basel 
III. In other countries such as Lebanon, regulators defined and published their new Basel III capital requirements in 2012. Banks 
in Lebanon were expected to comply with these capital standards as of 2012. 
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6.3. Alternative measures of market power and religion 
In the previous sections, we computed the Lerner index for each country and year without 
separating conventional and Islamic banks. We now compute the Lerner index for each year and for each 
bank category9 to check the robustness of the results. Then, we calculate the Lerner index for all banks 
(Lerner market, Lerner_MKT) as the sum of the Lerner index for conventional banks and the Lerner 
index for Islamic banks. We use Eqs. (1)–(2) to develop our model. We present the results in Table 9 
Panel A.1 for the effect of creditor rights×Lerner_MKT on conventional and Islamic banks’ capital ratios. 
As for the impact of religion, we replace the ratio reflecting the proportion of the population that is 
Muslim with a variable that captures the importance of religion in each country, computed using data 
from the World Values Surveys (WVS).  
Table 9 Panels B.1 and C.1 present the effect of creditor rights×Lerner_MKT on conventional and 
Islamic banks’ capital ratios after splitting the sample between countries where religion is considered very 
important versus countries where religion is considered less important.10 Finally, Table 9 Panels A.2, B.2 
and C.2 report the impact of creditor rights on bank capital ratios when market power is high computed at 
different values of Lerner index (25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles). 
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
Table 9, Panels A.2 and C.2 further confirm the baseline results. We find that for the full sample 
and for countries in which religion is less important, when market power is high, conventional banks 
continue to hold high capital ratios in the presence of stronger creditor rights. We also find that Islamic 
banks tend to hold high capital ratios, suggesting that they too feel the need to provide a better signalling 
mechanism to preserve the confidence of IAHs. In countries where religion is not very important, the 
results across quantiles further suggest that increased market power may effectively lead Islamic banks to 
protect their IAHs to a greater extent and to treat them in a similar way to conventional depositors, albeit 
depositors who are Sharia’a compliant. 
We also replace the Lerner index by the n-bank concentration ratio, in particular the C3 and C5 
ratios (concentration ratios of the biggest three and five banks, according to their share of total assets and 
                                                          
9 Islamic banks might also compete with each other in a segmented market. Accordingly, computing the Lerner index for each 
country without separating conventional and Islamic banks might bias the results. Therefore, we re-estimate the Lerner index for 
each bank category separately to examine whether the between-bank competition for each bank type could affect our findings.      
10 Here we split the sample of banks according to the importance of religion in each country. Specifically, we split the sample 
into countries where the importance of religion is above the 75th percentile of the populations of the surveyed countries and 
countries where the importance of religion is below or equal to the 75th percentile of the populations of the surveyed countries. 
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total customer deposits).11 Table 10, Panel A presents the results for the effect of creditor rights×C3 on 
conventional and Islamic banks’ capital ratios at different values of C3 (25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th 
percentiles). Once again, we find that when bank concentration is high, the two bank types tend to hold 
high capital ratios. The alternative measure of bank competition is also tested in when splitting the sample 
between predominantly Muslim and predominantly non-Muslim countries. Table 10 Panels B.1 and B.2 
report the results. We find that increased bank concentration in predominantly non-Muslim countries may 
require Islamic banks to protect their depositors by holding higher capital ratios, thus confirming our 
previous findings.  
[Insert Table 10 around here] 
6.4. Sample composition 
We further investigate whether our baseline findings are driven by other factors such as the 
countries’ income and legal origins, bank age, and periods of economic fluctuations. 
We first investigate whether the baseline results are robust across countries with different income 
levels. Djankov et al. (2007) find that wealthier countries might have a more efficient bankruptcy system 
and thus the legal enforcement for creditor protection is more important. Accordingly, we expect a 
stronger effect of creditor rights on bank capital ratios in high-income countries. To test this, we use Eq. 
(4) below and interact creditor rights with two dummy variables (INCjt): (1) Poor (equals 1 if country 
GDP per capita < median and 0 otherwise) and (2) Rich (equals 1 if country GDP per capita >= median 
and 0 otherwise). The results, in Table 11 Panel A, show that operating in a rich country strengthens the 
positive association between creditor rights and capital ratios for conventional banks, while the findings 
are not significant for Islamic banks.  
CAPijt = α + ∑ βINC × CRjt × INCjt
INC
INC=1
+ ∑ βR × CRjt × INCjt × Islamici +
INC
INC=1
β2 × Bank_deterijt−1 + β3
× Macro_deterjt + ∑ βt × YFEt
T
T=1
+ εit (4) 
                                                          
11 We are grateful to the referee for bringing our attention to the use of concentration ratios, i.e. C3 and C5, as alternative 
measures of bank competition. For brevity, we only report the C3 results and only for total assets. The results for C3 and C5 
according to the share of total customer deposits are available from the authors upon request.  
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Second, we refer to the law and finance literature and examine whether legal origins can affect the 
association between creditor rights and bank capital decisions. According to Djankov et al. (2007) there 
are five main legal origins: English, French, German, Nordic, and Socialist. Because our study only 
concentrates on countries where conventional and Islamic banks operate, we count the existence of the 
first three legal origins: (i) The English legal origin (English), which refers to the common law in 
England, and colonies to which it spread, such as the KSA, the UAE and Iran; (ii) The French legal origin 
(French), which refers to the civil law of France and its former colonies, such as Algeria, Indonesia, and 
Turkey; and (iii) The German legal origin (German), which refers to the laws of the Germanic countries 
in central Europe such as Bosnia. We also use Eq. (4) and interact creditor rights with the three legal 
dummy variables, namely English, French, and German.12 Table 11 Panel B suggests that operating in a 
common law country strengthens the positive association between creditor protection and capital ratios, 
more so than in other legal systems. However, again, Islamic banks are not affected.  
  [Insert Table 11 around here] 
Third, we test whether a bank’s decision to hold higher capital ratios in the presence of a more 
protective environment for creditors is affected by the level of experience of the two bank types. We also 
use Eq. (4) and interact creditor rights with three dummy variables that represent bank experience.13 
Table 12 Panel A consistently shows that when conventional banks are mature, the positive association 
between creditor rights and capital ratios is strengthened. Interestingly, the results show that in the 
presence of strong creditor rights, young Islamic banks are also inclined to hold high capital ratios 
compared to their young conventional counterparts and compared to more established Islamic banks. The 
F-test (Wald) for the degree of significance between creditor rights’ coefficients of Islamic and 
conventional banks confirm these findings. The significant positive association between creditor rights 
and young Islamic banks’ capital implies that less experienced banks with a less established reputation 
                                                          
12 English legal origin takes on a value of one if the country applies common law in its legal system, and zero otherwise. French 
legal origin takes on a value of one if the country applies civil law in its legal system, and zero otherwise. German legal origin 
takes on a value of one if the country applies Germanic law in its legal system, and zero otherwise.  
13 We proxy for experience using bank age. Banks that have been operating for a period less than ten years are categorized as 
young banks (Young equals one if young, zero otherwise), while those which have been operating for a period ranging between 
ten and twenty years are considered middle-aged banks (Middle equals one if middle-aged, zero otherwise). Finally, banks which 
have been operating for more than twenty years are considered mature banks (Mature equals one if mature, zero otherwise). 
21 
   
might effectively need to hold high capital ratios to gain the confidence of customers and attract new 
depositors.    
Finally, we examine whether the association between creditor protection and capital ratios varies 
for different periods of an economic cycle – that is, periods of growth versus financial distress. Because 
the sample includes the subprime crisis period, Table 12 Panel B examines the period before (1999–
2006), during (2007–2009), and after (2010–2013) the financial crisis. We use Eq. (4) and interact 
creditor rights with three dummy variables that represent periods (cycles) before, during, and after the 
subprime crisis. We find that for conventional banks, the positive association between creditor rights and 
capital ratios is stronger in the post crisis period. Such results could reflect the strict policies in terms of 
new banking regulatory guidelines and a more protective institutional environment in the period that 
followed the subprime crisis.    
[Insert Table 12 around here] 
6.5. Endogeneity and self-selection bias  
Current literature on Islamic and conventional banks is largely silent about endogeneity and lacks 
specific instruments that can be used when examining the association between creditor rights and bank 
capital. In this study, we use an instrumental variables approach (IV). We refer to Meslier et al. (2017) 
and include the two-year lagged value of the profitability ratio and the lagged value of the profitability 
ratio of the banking industry, as well as the bank- and the country-level control variables. The 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics indicate that our instruments are valid. In addition, the non-significant value 
of the Hansen J-statistics (an over-identification test) shows that our instruments are not correlated with 
the error term. The results of the first-stage regressions are reported in Table 13 Panel A, Models (1), (6), 
and (11). They show that the two instruments are positively associated with conventional and Islamic 
banks’ capital adequacy ratio. The results of the second-stage regressions are reported in Table 13 Panel 
A, Models (2) and (3) for conventional banks, Models (7) and (8) for Islamic banks, and (12) and (13) for 
the entire sample. We use two estimation techniques: (1) Two-Stage Least Squares regression (2SLS) and 
(3) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The second stage regression results show clear evidence of 
a positive and significant association at the 1% level between creditor rights and capital ratios for 
conventional banks and the entire sample, thus providing additional support for our earlier findings and 
suggesting that the results are not driven by endogeneity. Table 13 Panels B and C report the results when 
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considering the effect of the interaction between creditor rights and bank market power on capital 
adequacy ratio. The findings continue to show that both bank types hold higher capital ratios when 
market power is stronger.   
[Insert Table 13 around here] 
Second, we use a Heckman (1979) selection approach to correct for a potential self-selection bias in 
the sample choice between highly capitalized banks and less capitalized ones. In a first step, we estimate 
a probit model that regresses a dummy variable – which takes on a value of one if a bank’s capital 
adequacy ratio has a value greater than or equal to the median and zero otherwise – on the two 
instruments used before (lagged values of the profitability ratio and the profitability ratio of the banking 
industry). The regression also includes bank- and country-level control variables and year fixed effects. In 
the second-stage regression, we use the capital adequacy ratio as the dependent variable and the creditor 
rights’ index as the independent variable, along with the same control variables and a self-selection 
parameter (measured as the inverse Mills ratio) estimated from the first-stage regression. The results of 
the first-stage regressions are reported in Table 13, Panel A, Models (4), (9), and (14) and show that the 
two instruments are positively associated with the capital adequacy ratios. The results of the second-stage 
regressions are reported in Table 13, Panel A, Models (5), (10), and (15) and continue to suggest that 
conventional banks are more capitalized in countries with a higher creditor rights’ index while the results 
are insignificant for Islamic banks. Table 13 Panels B and C report very similar results when considering 
the effect of the interaction between creditor rights and bank market power. Therefore, our results remain 
robust even after correcting for a potential self-selection bias.14  
7. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether capital decisions for Islamic banks and conventional 
banks are associated with creditor rights. Our findings consistently indicate that only conventional banks 
tend to hold higher capital ratios in the presence of stronger creditor protection, presumably to secure 
depositors’ confidence. As regards Islamic banks, presumably because the PLS principle imposed by 
Sharia’a law considers depositors as investors who agree to share profits and losses with shareholders, 
the extent of creditor protection does not influence these banks’ decision to hold more or less capital. 
                                                          
14 For brevity, we only report the results for capital adequacy ratio. The results for core capital ratio are very similar and available 
from the authors upon request. In further unreported results, we control for additional omitted variables, use a propensity score 
matching (PSM) technique, and use four alternative estimation methods. The results remain unchanged and are available from 
the authors upon request.  
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Nevertheless, a deeper investigation shows that in predominantly non-Muslim countries with strong 
market power, managers of Islamic banks tend to hold more capital in the presence of stronger creditor 
protection. Thus, these managers might feel pressure to protect their depositors by holding more capital to 
reduce the withdrawal risk and maintain their market share of deposits. Under such conditions, Sharia’a 
compliant deposits might in fact closely resemble conventional deposits.  
Our work sheds light on the differences in the factors associated with capital ratios for conventional 
and Islamic banks. It also has important policy implications for dual banking systems where the two types 
of bank operate under the authority of a single regulator. Regulators and supervisors need to account for 
such differences in their monitoring process and in deciding upon the additional amount of regulatory 
capital required for each bank (pillar two of Basel III).  
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Tables  
 
Table 1  
Summary statistics 
 Capital 
adequacy 
Core 
capital 
Size 
 
Profitably 
 
Risk 
 
Liquidity 
 
Tangibility 
 
Lerner  Lerner_MKT Governance Creditor 
rights 
GDP 
growth 
Inflation Oil Minerals 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics by country 
Albania 19.78 13.99 12.61 0.49 52.05 45.67 2.33 0.13 0.07 -0.39 3.00 5.03 3.15 2.11 0.24 
Algeria 17.99 14.64 14.09 1.50 61.20 54.73 2.60 0.47 0.42 -0.87 1.00 3.61 9.00 22.99 0.12 
Bangladesh 11.84 9.60 13.28 0.83 62.93 27.60 1.56 0.22 0.21 -0.89 2.00 5.82 5.43 0.11 0.00 
Bosnia 21.51 23.62 12.15 0.42 73.64 49.35 5.49 0.16 0.16 -0.40 3.00 3.89 5.21 0.00 0.55 
Egypt 16.67 13.34 14.53 0.85 41.42 37.78 1.20 0.16 0.22 -0.53 2.00 4.41 8.14 8.22 0.20 
Indonesia 22.60 17.44 13.59 1.18 53.43 42.66 1.60 0.18 0.20 -0.63 2.00 5.11 10.67 4.14 1.65 
Iran 19.48 17.30 16.03 1.47 60.22 30.33 3.59 0.26 0.27 -1.62 2.00 3.96 18.04 25.87 0.65 
Jordan 16.95 14.06 14.64 1.13 44.89 42.18 1.63 0.29 0.32 -0.02 1.00 5.26 4.76 0.00 1.26 
Kenya 24.43 22.41 11.97 1.58 66.21 41.86 2.91 0.23 0.24 -0.72 4.00 4.18 6.44 0.00 0.07 
Kuwait 20.91 18.92 15.63 1.27 45.96 39.58 2.69 0.33 0.36 0.20 3.00 4.63 10.10 49.39 0.00 
Lebanon 19.75 17.44 13.82 0.69 26.89 41.73 2.65 0.20 0.14 -0.55 4.00 4.34 2.14 0.00 0.00 
Malaysia 20.66 17.75 15.14 0.89 50.31 45.16 0.49 0.25 0.26 0.35 3.00 5.13 3.48 6.63 0.11 
Mauritania 18.45 . 11.49 1.28 50.58 50.03 5.56 0.33 0.10 -0.55 1.00 4.37 6.14 4.35 25.22 
Pakistan 15.06 12.07 13.22 0.24 40.99 28.13 2.88 0.11 0.16 -1.01 1.00 4.05 10.94 0.83 0.05 
Saudi Arabia 19.74 17.96 16.60 2.13 53.46 33.07 1.36 0.45 0.44 -0.22 3.00 5.10 6.58 43.80 0.02 
Senegal 15.06 13.25 12.36 1.05 68.97 25.80 3.01 0.17 0.17 1.49 0.00 3.94 2.29 0.00 0.86 
Singapore 28.51 21.18 15.31 1.04 46.52 35.23 0.41 0.25 0.25 0.33 3.00 5.77 0.87 0.00 0.00 
South Africa 17.97 14.96 13.99 1.16 75.59 27.46 1.05 0.22 0.19 -1.52 3.00 3.34 7.10 0.12 2.18 
Syria 29.59 26.87 13.45 0.46 35.27 79.44 3.94 0.39 0.41 -0.09 3.00 3.05 7.01 22.11 0.00 
Tunisia 16.3 13.56 13.71 0.61 61.01 43.77 1.89 0.29 0.27 -0.12 0.00 4.11 3.54 3.76 0.65 
Turkey 18.89 16.43 15.17 1.50 48.52 43.13 1.98 0.16 0.22 0.51 2.00 3.90 19.76 0.16 0.14 
UAE 21.39 18.64 15.41 1.98 61.55 33.29 1.44 0.42 0.42 1.47 2.00 4.55 7.96 20.59 0.00 
UK 15.57 18 14.32 0.37 37.45 70.65 0.86 0.10 0.19 -0.92 4.00 1.90 2.20 1.02 0.00 
Yemen 29.74 13.52 12.34 0.62 24.06 51.44 2.45 0.09 0.24 -1.12 0.00 2.70 13.36 28.59 0.00 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics for conventional banks 
N 3,633 2,529 6,257 6,227 6,211 5,820 6,094 4,957        
Mean  19.63 16.51 14.01 1.00 49.83 45.79 1.80 0.21        
Min  10.05 7.51 9.69 -9.54 3.06 2.16 0.01 0.05        
Q1 13.40 11.3 12.54 0.40 33.03 20.52 0.50 0.11        
Median 16.50 14.64 13.86 1.01 52.24 34.27 1.12 0.23        
Q3 21.77 18.1 15.31 1.75 67.24 57.84 2.21 0.34        
Max 49.01 42.25 19.89 8.23 88.74 314.97 13.43 0.91        
SD 9.77 8.3 2.09 2.00 22.75 42.55 2.20 0.73        
Panel C. Descriptive statistics for Islamic banks 
N 612 530 926 923 916 876 909 761        
Mean  21.29 18.38 14.10 0.59 53.73 46.91 2.43 0.22        
Min  9.43 7.70 10.76 -20.14 0.03 1.46 0.00 0.01        
Q1 13.01 11.08 12.64 0.31 41.51 19.00 0.59 0.11        
Median 16.01 13.97 14.28 0.84 58.85 28.89 1.56 0.27        
Q3 21.05 17.94 15.50 1.54 69.58 48.82 2.95 0.37        
Max 86.00 79.80 16.93 14.58 98.86 546.19 17.23 0.85        
SD 16.76 15 1.79 3.13 22.94 68.97 3.05 0.27        
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics by country for the full sample (Panel A), for the sample of conventional banks (Panel B), and for the sample of Islamic banks (Panel C). The reported 
values in Panel A are the means of the respective variables for each country. The sample consists of 793 conventional and Islamic banks operating in 24 countries over the period 1999–2013.   
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Table 2 
Bank regulatory capital ratios as a function of countries’ creditor rights 
Value of creditor 
rights’ index  
Capital adequacy (%) Core capital (%) 
0 15.6 13.52 
1 16.31 1323 
2 19.08 15.01 
3 21.21 18.74 
4 21.39 19.37 
F-value* (Chi2) 21.91*** 41.01*** 
This table presents the pattern of regulatory capital ratios, i.e. capital 
adequacy and core capital, as a function of the creditor rights’ index. 
*Analysis of Variance F-test for regulatory capital ratios’ mean 
difference conditioned on different values of the creditor rights’ 
index.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Mean capital adequacy ratio and core capital ratio for groups of countries classified by creditor rights. The mean regulatory capital ratio for each value of the creditor rights’ index is calculated by a two-
step approach. First, we compute the mean regulatory capital ratios for all bank-years of each country for the 1999-2013 period. Second, we calculate the mean of these countries’ means for a group defined by a 
given creditor rights’ index. N is the number of countries that belong to each of the five creditor rights’ groups.       
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Table 3  
The effect of creditor rights on bank capital ratios 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level.  
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
 
Panel A. The impact of creditor rights on bank capital ratios 
 
 
Model # 
Conventional banks  Islamic banks  Full sample 
Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Creditor rights (𝛽1) 0.354** 
(0.171) 
0.417** 
(0.174) 
 0.539*** 
(0.175) 
0.547*** 
(0.188) 
 0.918* 
(0.505) 
0.46 
(0.555) 
 0.786 
(0.515) 
0.247 
(0.604) 
 0.364** 
(0.171) 
0.440** 
(0.171) 
 0.567*** 
(0.172) 
0.564*** 
(0.182) 
Size -0.688*** 
(0.089) 
-0.709*** 
(0.088) 
 -0.938*** 
(0.083) 
-0.942*** 
(0.085) 
 -1.287*** 
(0.327) 
-1.681*** 
(0.308) 
 -1.666*** 
(0.378) 
-2.096*** 
(0.344) 
 -0.713*** 
(0.085) 
-0.75*** 
(0.085) 
 -0.972*** 
(0.082) 
-0.992*** 
(0.084) 
Profitability 0.090** 
(0.044) 
0.082* 
(0.045) 
 0.189*** 
(0.058) 
0.188*** 
(0.059) 
 0.219*** 
(0.077) 
0.192*** 
(0.067) 
 0.414*** 
(0.078) 
0.365*** 
(0.073) 
 0.096** 
(0.039) 
0.083** 
(0.039) 
 0.21*** 
(0.049) 
0.201*** 
(0.049) 
Risk -0.041*** 
(0.009) 
-0.043*** 
(0.008) 
 -0.041*** 
(0.010) 
-0.043*** 
(0.011) 
 -0.005 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
 -0.021 
(0.014) 
-0.013 
(0.016) 
 -0.036*** 
(0.007) 
-0.038*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.036*** 
(0.008) 
-0.037*** 
(0.008) 
Liquidity 0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
 -0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.004) 
 -0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
 0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
 0.001 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
Tangibility 0.132* 
(0.068) 
0.109 
(0.071) 
 0.051 
(0.076) 
0.009 
(0.078) 
 0.427*** 
(0.157) 
0.253 
(0.156) 
 0.605*** 
(0.174) 
0.437** 
(0.178) 
 0.168*** 
(0.063) 
0.137** 
(0.065) 
 0.145* 
(0.076) 
0.104 
(0.079) 
Governance 1.244*** 
(0.271) 
1.167*** 
(0.272) 
 1.653*** 
(0.231) 
1.672*** 
(0.249) 
 1.7*** 
(0.530) 
1.674*** 
(0.534) 
 1.828*** 
(0.552) 
1.726*** 
(0.591) 
 1.267*** 
(0.242) 
1.164*** 
(0.241) 
 1.61*** 
(0.210) 
1.513*** 
(0.218) 
GDP growth  -0.022 
(0.025) 
  -0.06 
(0.021) 
  -0.053 
(0.056) 
  -0.034 
(0.073) 
  -0.027 
(0.023) 
  -0.021 
(0.021) 
Inflation  -0.025* 
(0.013) 
  -0.008 
(0.011) 
  -0.062** 
(0.026) 
  -0.049** 
(0.024) 
  -0.026** 
(0.011) 
  -0.014 
(0.010) 
Oil  0.048*** 
(0.012) 
  0.019 
(0.014) 
  0.144*** 
(0.025) 
  0.146*** 
(0.023) 
  0.062*** 
(0.012) 
  0.048*** 
(0.013) 
Mineral  0.159** 
(0.069) 
  0.206** 
(0.099) 
  0.247* 
(0.146) 
  0.189 
(0.116) 
  0.157** 
(0.067) 
  0.2** 
(0.085) 
Islamic             -1.450 
(1.227) 
-1.211 
(1.234) 
 0.565 
(1.250) 
0.782 
(1.250) 
Islamic × 
Creditor rights (𝛽3) 
            0.453 
(0.496) 
0.099 
(0.495) 
 -0.119 
(0.532) 
-0.425 
(0.532) 
Constant 28.44*** 
(1.498) 
28.71*** 
(1.480) 
 29.81*** 
(1.598) 
29.88*** 
(1.659) 
 33.26*** 
(5.080) 
38.60*** 
(4.808) 
 38.23*** 
(5.816) 
44.00*** 
(5.035) 
 28.48*** 
(1.406) 
28.85*** 
(1.379) 
 29.76*** 
(1.414) 
29.87*** 
(1.435) 
N 3,129 3,020  2,276 2,194  445 423  390 369  3,574 3,443  2,666 2,563 
Year dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 0.179 0.22  0.239 0.271  0.246 0.382  0.25 0.38  0.185 0.232  0.233 0.282 
Chi2 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Panel B. Impact of creditor rights on capital ratios of Islamic banks (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) compared to conventional banks (𝛽1) 
             0.817* 
(0.461) 
0.539 
(0.465) 
 0.448 
(0.502) 
0.139 
(0.503) 
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Table 4  
The effect of market power on the association between creditor rights and bank capital ratios 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
Panel A. Controlling for market power 
 Conventional banks    Islamic banks    Entire sample   
 Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio 
Model # (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Creditor 
rights (𝛽1) 
0.460** 
(0.225) 
0.514** 
(0.222) 
 0.671*** 
(0.228) 
0.677*** 
(0.245) 
 0.29 
(0.537) 
0.043 
(0.587) 
 0.369 
(0.553) 
0.061 
(0.668) 
 0.466** 
(0.207) 
0.517** 
(0.207) 
 0.649*** 
(0.213) 
0.602*** 
(0.227) 
Lerner 1.608 
(1.017) 
1.608 
(1.017) 
 0.503 
(0.728) 
0.375 
(0.776) 
 -4.854*** 
(1.643) 
-4.456** 
(2.050) 
 -5.149*** 
(1.703) 
-5.385** 
(2.316) 
 1.026 
(0.850) 
0.856 
(0.856) 
 0.071 
(0.579) 
-0.086 
(0.622) 
Creditor rights 
× Lerner (𝛽3) 
-0.627* 
(0.336) 
-0.601* 
(0.332) 
 -0.253 
(0.243) 
-0.24 
(0.258) 
 2.915*** 
(0.704) 
2.265** 
(1.119) 
 3.001*** 
(0.622) 
2.605*** 
(0.954) 
 -0.424 
(0.281) 
-0.411 
(0.281) 
 -0.103 
(0.193) 
-0.077 
(0.209) 
Size -0.59*** 
(0.116) 
-0.636*** 
(0.112) 
 -0.892*** 
(0.114) 
-0.892*** 
(0.114) 
 -1.165*** 
(0.359) 
-1.515*** 
(0.333) 
 -1.583*** 
(0.362) 
-1.917*** 
(0.315) 
 -0.616*** 
(0.109) 
-0.659*** 
(0.107) 
 -0.93*** 
(0.105) 
-0.932*** 
(0.107) 
Profitability 0.095* 
(0.053) 
0.095* 
(0.054) 
 0.173** 
(0.068) 
0.183*** 
(0.070) 
 0.297** 
(0.116) 
0.26** 
(0.110) 
 0.462*** 
(0.083) 
0.448*** 
(0.086) 
 0.127*** 
(0.049) 
0.124** 
(0.049) 
 0.225*** 
(0.060) 
0.228*** 
(0.060) 
Risk -0.043*** 
(0.0106) 
-0.045*** 
(0.011) 
 -0.037*** 
(0.012) 
-0.039*** 
(0.013) 
 -0.005 
(0.014) 
0.008 
(0.018) 
 -0.017 
(0.019) 
-0.016 
(0.026) 
 -0.038*** 
(0.009) 
-0.04*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.033*** 
(0.010) 
-0.034*** 
(0.010) 
Liquidity 0.003 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
 -0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
 0.008 
(0.006) 
0.01* 
(0.006) 
 0.001 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
 -0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
Tangibility 0.183** 
(0.082) 
0.143* 
(0.084) 
 0.067 
(0.094) 
0.026 
(0.090) 
 0.532** 
(0.260) 
0.225 
(0.267) 
 0.648** 
(0.262) 
0.391 
(0.259) 
 0.201*** 
(0.075) 
0.155** 
(0.077) 
 0.132 
(0.091) 
0.087 
(0.089) 
Governance 1.104*** 
(0.324) 
0.987*** 
(0.332) 
 1.383*** 
(0.274) 
1.326*** 
(0.289) 
 1.866*** 
(0.643) 
1.879*** 
(0.617) 
 2.232*** 
(0.562) 
2.085*** 
(0.602) 
 1.153*** 
(0.283) 
0.964*** 
(0.290) 
 1.451*** 
(0.236) 
1.215*** 
(0.243) 
GDP growth  -0.05 
(0.036) 
  0.002 
(0.029) 
  -0.112* 
(0.067) 
  -0.114 
(0.118) 
  -0.061* 
(0.032) 
  -0.021 
(0.031) 
Inflation  -0.033** 
(0.017) 
  -0.021* 
(0.013) 
  -0.038 
(0.044) 
  -0.0136 
(0.038) 
  -0.026* 
(0.015) 
  -0.018 
(0.013) 
Oil  0.059*** 
(0.015) 
  0.042*** 
(0.015) 
  0.127*** 
(0.031) 
  0.131*** 
(0.028) 
  0.065*** 
(0.013) 
  0.062*** 
(0.014) 
Mineral  0.161** 
(0.0735) 
  0.250** 
(0.100) 
  0.747* 
(0.396) 
  0.742 
(0.486) 
  0.179** 
(0.078) 
  0.265*** 
(0.093) 
Constant 26.76*** 
(1.977) 
27.50*** 
(1.939) 
 28.6*** 
(2.068) 
28.43*** 
(2.094) 
 32.03*** 
(5.611) 
36.47*** 
(5.050) 
 36.75*** 
(5.578) 
41.51*** 
(4.608) 
 26.85*** 
(1.800) 
26.85*** 
(1.800) 
 28.88*** 
(1.785) 
28.55*** 
(1.806) 
N 2,019 1,937  1,528 1,464  313 291  280 259  2,332 2,228  1,808 1,723 
Year dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 0.181 0.232  0.184 0.252  0.368 0.476  0.388 0.533  0.191 0.244  0.194 0.275 
Panel B. Impact of creditor rights when market power is high (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) on conventional banks’ (Models 1 to 4), Islamic banks’ (Models 5 to 8) and the entire sample’s (Models 9 to 12) capital ratios computed at 
different values of the Lerner index 
25thpercentile 0.394* 
(0.214) 
0.451** 
(0.212) 
 0.644*** 
(0.222) 
0.651*** 
(0.238) 
 0.597 
(0.551) 
0.282 
(0.605) 
 0.686 
(0.576) 
0.337 
(0.697) 
 0.421** 
(0.200) 
0.474** 
(0.200) 
 0.638*** 
(0.209) 
0.593*** 
(0.222) 
50thpercentile 0.313 
(0.209) 
0.373* 
(0.207) 
 0.611*** 
(0.218) 
0.62*** 
(0.233) 
 0.975* 
(0.580) 
0.576 
(0.656) 
 1.075* 
(0.613) 
0.674 
(0.749) 
 0.366* 
(0.197) 
0.421** 
(0.198) 
 0.624*** 
(0.208) 
0.584*** 
(0.220) 
75thpercentile 0.244 
(0.212) 
0.306 
(0.211) 
 0.583*** 
(0.219) 
0.593** 
(0.234) 
 1.297** 
(0.615) 
0.826 
(0.719) 
 1.407** 
(0.651) 
0.962 
(0.806) 
 0.319 
(0.199) 
0.375* 
(0.202) 
 0.613*** 
(0.209) 
0.575*** 
(0.221) 
90thpercentile 0.169 
(0.221) 
0.235 
(0.221) 
 0.553** 
(0.224) 
0.565** 
(0.236) 
 1.646** 
(0.661) 
1.097 
(0.805) 
 1.766** 
(0.697) 
1.273 
(0.878) 
 0.268 
(0.208) 
0.326 
(0.211) 
 0.601*** 
(0.212) 
0.566** 
(0.224) 
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Table 5  
The effect of market power on the association between creditor rights and bank capital ratios: Predominantly Muslim vs. predominantly non-Muslim countries  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: In all panels, we only report the coefficient estimates of the creditor rights’ index, the Lerner index, and their interactions to save space. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are 
reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
 Conventional banks  Islamic banks  Entire sample 
 Capital adequacy ratio Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio Core capital ratio 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Panel A.1. Predominantly Muslim countries 
Creditor 
rights (𝛽1) 
-0.825 
(0.986) 
-1.176 
(1.025) 
-0.556 
(0.930) 
-0.818 
(1.270) 
 -1.691* 
(1.002) 
-1.600** 
(0.784) 
-2.276* 
(1.185) 
-1.259 
(1.241) 
 -0.481 
(0.879) 
-0.904 
(0.917) 
-0.111 
(0.864) 
-0.942 
(0.997) 
Lerner -0.500 
(1.389) 
-0.335 
(1.338) 
-2.277 
(1.505) 
-2.354 
(1.592) 
 -5.163** 
(2.601) 
-3.536 
(2.512) 
-3.648 
(2.461) 
-3.117 
(3.515) 
 -1.105 
(1.277) 
-0.343 
(1.257) 
-1.838 
(1.271) 
-1.423 
(1.326) 
Creditor rights 
× Lerner (𝛽3) 
0.602 
(1.366) 
0.226 
(1.316) 
2.026 
(1.371) 
2.048 
(1.451) 
 6.471*** 
(1.501) 
1.513 
(2.234) 
6.245*** 
(1.592) 
3.293 
(3.266) 
 1.098 
(1.295) 
0.222 
(1.273) 
1.843 
(1.213) 
1.350 
(1.304) 
N 329 329 277 277  78 78 67 67  407 407 344 344 
Bank & country 
control 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.209 0.29 0.244 0.256  0.556 0.691 0.583 0.642  0.161 0.222 0.181 0.228 
Panel A.2. Impact of creditor rights when market power is high (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) on conventional banks’ (Models 1 to 4), Islamic banks’ (Models 5 to 8) and the entire sample’s (Models 9 to 12) 
capital ratios computed at different values of the Lerner index, in predominantly Muslim countries 
25thpercentile -0.755 
(0.869) 
-1.15 
(0.929) 
-0.319 
(0.826) 
-0.578 
(1.185) 
 -0.934 
(0.882) 
-1.423* 
(0.770) 
-1.545 
(1.061) 
-0.873 
(1.268) 
 -0.352 
(0.783) 
-0.878 
(0.858) 
0.104 
(0.782) 
-0.784 
(0.987) 
50thpercentile -0.659 
(0.735) 
-1.114 
(0.828) 
0.002 
(0.719) 
-0.253 
(1.102) 
 0.092 
(0.756) 
-1.183 
(0.884) 
-0.554 
(0.926) 
-0.351 
(1.471) 
 -0.178 
(0.687) 
-0.843 
(0.816) 
0.397 
(0.703) 
-0.57 
(1.012) 
75thpercentile -0.588 
(0.665) 
-1.087 
(0.781) 
0.241 
(0.676) 
-0.011 
(1.068) 
 0.855 
(0.702) 
-1.005 
(1.042) 
0.182 
(0.862) 
0.037 
(1.711) 
 -0.048 
(0.650) 
-0.817 
(0.816) 
0.614 
(0.674) 
-0.411 
(1.056) 
90thpercentile -0.515 
(0.628) 
-1.06 
(0.764) 
0.487 
(0.669) 
0.236 
(1.061) 
 1.639** 
(0.690) 
-0.821 
(1.241) 
0.938 
(0.835) 
0.436 
(2.005) 
 0.084 
(0.647) 
-0.79 
(0.845) 
0.837 
(0.675) 
-0.247 
(1.122) 
Panel B.1. Predominantly non-Muslim countries 
Creditor 
rights (𝛽1) 
0.969*** 
(0.299) 
1.605*** 
(0.292) 
1.163*** 
(0.301) 
1.825*** 
(0.304) 
 1.177 
(1.257) 
0.560 
(1.331) 
1.475 
(1.199) 
1.001 
(1.460) 
 1.080*** 
(0.289) 
1.671*** 
(0.282) 
1.269*** 
(0.286) 
1.850*** 
(0.292) 
Lerner 3.730** 
(1.764) 
3.808** 
(1.818) 
1.573 
(1.328) 
1.987 
(1.431) 
 -10.88 
(7.598) 
-10.76 
(7.564) 
-11.62 
(7.229) 
-11.00 
(7.371) 
 3.361** 
(1.675) 
3.685** 
(1.724) 
1.349 
(1.267) 
1.926 
(1.386) 
Creditor rights 
× Lerner (𝛽3) 
-1.331** 
(0.584) 
-1.397** 
(0.601) 
-0.608 
(0.442) 
-0.763 
(0.477) 
 5.040* 
(2.665) 
4.826* 
(2.705) 
5.143** 
(2.486) 
4.691* 
(2.522) 
 -1.202** 
(0.554) 
-1.341** 
(0.568) 
-0.528 
(0.422) 
-0.734 
(0.462) 
N 1,690 1,608 1,251 1,187  235 213 213 192  1,925 1,821 1,464 1,379 
Bank & country 
control 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.204 0.344 0.239 0.412  0.553 0.558 0.538 0.592  0.231 0.364 0.267 0.412 
Panel B.2. Impact of creditor rights when market power is high (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) on conventional banks’ (Models 1 to 4), Islamic banks’ (Models 5 to 8), and the entire sample’s (Models 9 to 12) 
capital ratios computed at different values of the Lerner index, in predominantly non-Muslim countries 
25thpercentile 0.832*** 
(0.290) 
1.461*** 
(0.279) 
1.1*** 
(0.292) 
1.746*** 
(0.289) 
 1.697 
(1.101) 
1.059 
(1.168) 
2.006* 
(1.067) 
1.486 
(1.302) 
 0.956*** 
(0.280) 
1.533*** 
(0.269) 
1.215*** 
(0.277) 
1.774*** 
(0.278) 
50thpercentile 0.67** 
(0.295) 
1.291*** 
(0.279) 
1.026*** 
(0.290) 
1.653*** 
(0.283) 
 2.31** 
(0.987) 
1.646 
(1.009) 
2.632*** 
(0.973) 
2.056* 
(1.166) 
 0.81*** 
(0.284) 
1.37*** 
(0.270) 
1.15*** 
(0.275) 
1.685*** 
(0.271) 
75thpercentile 0.53* 
(0.313) 
1.144*** 
(0.299) 
0.962*** 
(0.296) 
1.573*** 
(0.286) 
 2.84*** 
(0.968) 
2.153** 
(1.009) 
3.172*** 
(0.973) 
2.549** 
(1.105) 
 0.683** 
(0.299) 
1.229*** 
(0.285) 
1.095*** 
(0.282) 
1.607*** 
(0.274) 
90thpercentile 0.376 
(0.344) 
0.983*** 
(0.330) 
0.892*** 
(0.311) 
1.485*** 
(0.300) 
 3.42*** 
(1.038) 
2.709** 
(1.064) 
3.765*** 
(1.045) 
3.089*** 
(1.108) 
 0.545* 
(0.328) 
1.074*** 
(0.314) 
1.034*** 
(0.296) 
1.523*** 
(0.287) 
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Table 6   
The effect of creditor rights’ variables extracted from principal components analysis on bank capital ratios  
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
Panel A. The impact of creditor rights’ components on bank capital ratios 
 Conventional banks  Islamic banks  Entire sample 
 Capital adequacy ratio Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio Core capital ratio 
Model #  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  (6) (7) (8)   (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
CR_PCA1 0.333** 
(0.141) 
 0.46*** 
(0.150) 
  0.212 
(0.451) 
 0.036 
(0.524) 
  0.339** 
(0.138) 
 0.439*** 
(0.144) 
 
CR_PCA2  0.083 
(0.176) 
 0.006 
(0.179) 
  0.36 
(0.498) 
 0.281 
(0.501) 
  0.14 
(0.168) 
 0.073 
(0.176) 
Size -0.727*** 
(0.090) 
-0.683*** 
(0.086) 
-0.971*** 
(0.088) 
-0.909*** 
(0.083) 
 -1.677*** 
(0.317) 
-1.648*** 
(0.316) 
-2.084*** 
(0.357) 
-2.057*** 
(0.339) 
 -0.767*** 
(0.087) 
-0.72*** 
(0.083) 
-1.014*** 
(0.087) 
-0.953*** 
(0.082)  
Profitability 0.08* 
(0.044) 
0.08* 
(0.045) 
0.184*** 
(0.059) 
0.179*** 
(0.059) 
 0.19*** 
(0.068) 
0.186*** 
(0.068) 
0.36*** 
(0.077) 
0.36*** 
(0.074) 
 0.082** 
(0.039) 
0.08** 
(0.039) 
0.198*** 
(0.049) 
 0.195*** 
(0.049) 
Risk -0.042*** 
(0.008) 
-0.044*** 
(0.008) 
-0.042*** 
(0.011) 
-0.043*** 
(0.011) 
 0.005 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
 -0.036** 
(0.007)  
-0.038*** 
(0.007) 
-0.036*** 
(0.008) 
-0.038*** 
(0.008) 
Liquidity 0.005 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
 0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.006* 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
 0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Tangibility 0.108 
(0.071) 
0.111 
(0.071) 
0.003 
(0.078) 
-0.004 
(0.079) 
 0.244 
(0.152) 
0.243 
(0.155) 
0.427** 
(0.177) 
0.435** 
(0.175) 
 0.136** 
(0.065) 
0.136** 
(0.065) 
0.1 
(0.079) 
0.094 
(0.079) 
Governance 0.926*** 
(0.272) 
1.155*** 
(0.335) 
1.343*** 
(0.240) 
1.551*** 
(0.310) 
 1.555** 
(0.716) 
2.044*** 
(0.652) 
1.741** 
(0.819) 
1.975*** 
(0.642) 
 0.913*** 
(0.251) 
1.235*** 
(0.298) 
1.229*** 
(0.223) 
1.49*** 
(0.278) 
GDP growth -0.019 
(0.025) 
-0.025 
(0.026) 
-0.01 
(0.021) 
-0.019 
(0.021) 
 -0.049 
(0.056) 
-0.056 
(0.057) 
-0.032 
(0.073) 
-0.037 
(0.073) 
 -0.023 
(0.023) 
-0.03 
(0.024) 
-0.017 
(0.021) 
-0.026 
(0.021) 
Inflation -0.026** 
(0.013) 
-0.029** 
(0.013) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
 -0.064** 
(0.025) 
-0.065** 
(0.025) 
-0.051** 
(0.024) 
-0.05** 
(0.024) 
 -0.027** 
(0.011) 
-0.029*** 
(0.011) 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
-0.017* 
(0.010) 
Oil  0.043*** 
(0.013) 
0.048*** 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
0.02 
(0.014) 
 0.143*** 
(0.027) 
0.15*** 
(0.024) 
0.147*** 
(0.025) 
0.150*** 
(0.023) 
 0.057*** 
(0.012) 
0.063*** 
(0.012) 
0.043*** 
(0.013) 
0.049*** 
(0.013) 
Mineral 0.156** 
(0.073) 
0.14** 
(0.065) 
0.219** 
(0.101) 
0.176* 
(0.095) 
 0.251* 
(0.149) 
0.239 
(0.146) 
0.191 
(0.116) 
0.186 
(0.114) 
 0.154** 
(0.071) 
0.140** 
(0.064) 
0.211** 
(0.086) 
0.173** 
(0.082) 
Islamic            -1.098*** 
(0.407) 
-1.104** 
(0.499) 
-0.33 
(0.443) 
-0.245 
(0.574) 
Islamic × 
CR_PCA1 
          0.035 
(0.304) 
 -0.301 
(0.310) 
 
Islamic × 
CR_PCA2 
           0.031 
(0.371) 
 0.122 
(0.408) 
Constant 29.97*** 
(1.518) 
29.44*** 
(1.463) 
31.63*** 
(1.757) 
30.75*** 
(1.686) 
 39.43*** 
(4.704) 
39.44*** 
(4.554) 
44.3*** 
(5.295) 
44.25*** 
(5.013) 
 30.12*** 
(1.412) 
29.61*** 
(1.361) 
31.55*** 
(1.499) 
30.77*** 
(1.436) 
N 3,020 3,020 2,194 2,194  423 423 369 369  3,443 3,443 2,563 2,563 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.217 0.207 0.27 0.249  0.383 0.376 0.381 0.373  0.23 0.221 0.2815 0.264 
Wald Chi2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Panel B. Impact of creditor rights’ variables extracted from principal components analysis on capital ratios of Islamic banks (β1 + β3) 
           0.374 
(0.293) 
0.171 
(0.381) 
0.138 
(0.300) 
0.195 
(0.411) 
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Table 7  
The effect of creditor rights on bank capital ratios: Controlling for the internal governance structure 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
Panel A. The impact of creditor rights on bank capital ratios 
 
 
Model # 
Conventional banks  Islamic banks  Full sample 
Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Creditor 
rights (𝛽1) 
0.242 
(0.228) 
0.27 
(0.231) 
 0.545** 
(0.241) 
0.473* 
(0.256) 
 0.899 
(0.581) 
0.705 
(0.633) 
 0.217 
(0.582) 
-0.003 
(0.476) 
 0.348* 
(0.209) 
0.363* 
(0.211) 
 0.493** 
(0.217) 
0.407* 
(0.231) 
Size -0.622*** 
(0.114) 
-0.617*** 
(0.110) 
 -0.905*** 
(0.107) 
-0.864*** 
(0.108) 
 -0.376* 
(0.225) 
-0.859*** 
(0.255) 
 -0.487* 
(0.286) 
-1.113*** 
(0.233) 
 -0.594*** 
(0.103) 
-0.652*** 
(0.101) 
 -0.86*** 
(0.100) 
-0.891*** 
(0.102) 
Profitability 0.091 
(0.061) 
0.094 
(0.061) 
 0.207*** 
(0.068) 
0.214*** 
(0.069) 
 0.314** 
(0.131) 
0.266** 
(0.127) 
 0.418*** 
(0.117) 
0.328** 
(0.128) 
 0.118** 
(0.056) 
0.109** 
(0.055) 
 0.237*** 
(0.058) 
0.23*** 
(0.057) 
Risk -0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.02** 
(0.010) 
 -0.022** 
(0.009) 
-0.023** 
(0.009) 
 -0.021 
(0.021) 
-0.021 
(0.022) 
 0.001 
(0.025) 
0.003 
(0.024) 
 -0.019** 
(0.009) 
-0.021** 
(0.009) 
 -0.024*** 
(0.008) 
-0.025*** 
(0.009) 
Liquidity 0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.014** 
(0.005) 
 0.009 
(0.006) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
 0.002 
(0.004) 
0.00172 
(0.00324) 
 0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.01** 
(0.004) 
 0.005 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
Tangibility 0.304*** 
(0.111) 
0.304*** 
(0.115) 
 0.194* 
(0.111) 
0.197* 
(0.113) 
 0.326** 
(0.160) 
0.175 
(0.178) 
 0.414** 
(0.186) 
0.167 
(0.172) 
 0.275*** 
(0.097) 
0.256** 
(0.104) 
 0.202** 
(0.093) 
0.163* 
(0.095) 
Governance 1.686*** 
(0.321) 
1.527*** 
(0.319) 
 1.854*** 
(0.271) 
1.754*** 
(0.289) 
 0.571 
(0.564) 
0.611 
(0.524) 
 0.706 
(0.648) 
0.542 
(0.534) 
 1.615*** 
(0.288) 
1.463*** 
(0.285) 
 1.744*** 
(0.235) 
1.574*** 
(0.244) 
Board size -0.072 
(0.047) 
-0.07 
(0.047) 
 -0.088** 
(0.041) 
-0.089** 
(0.041) 
 -0.28*** 
(0.073) 
-0.251*** 
(0.075) 
 -0.263*** 
(0.065) 
-0.22*** 
(0.065) 
 -0.11*** 
(0.042) 
-0.098** 
(0.042) 
 -0.113*** 
(0.036) 
-0.109*** 
(0.036) 
Sharia’a board        -0.131 
(0.115) 
-0.102 
(0.117) 
 -0.276* 
(0.160) 
-0.294* 
(0.156) 
      
GDP growth  -0.021 
(0.031) 
  -0.023 
(0.028) 
  -0.14*** 
(0.044) 
  -0.084* 
(0.049) 
  -0.039 
(0.028) 
  -0.029 
(0.026) 
Inflation  -0.018 
(0.017) 
  -0.005 
(0.014) 
  0.005 
(0.022) 
  0.006 
(0.024) 
  -0.015 
(0.013) 
  -0.006 
(0.012) 
Oil  0.039*** 
(0.012) 
  0.018 
(0.015) 
  0.104*** 
(0.025) 
  0.133*** 
(0.020) 
  0.058*** 
(0.013) 
  0.046*** 
(0.014) 
Mineral  0.174 
(0.132) 
  0.135 
(0.095) 
  -0.082 
(0.514) 
  0.878 
(0.561) 
  0.173 
(0.128) 
  0.153* 
(0.092) 
Islamic             0.188 
(0.490) 
0.048 
(0.474) 
 0.538 
(0.526) 
0.557 
(0.505) 
Creditor rights 
× Lerner (𝛽3) 
            -0.172 
(0.202) 
-0.401** 
(0.182) 
 -0.064 
(0.214) 
-0.293 
(0.192) 
Constant 26.61*** 
(2.040) 
26.36*** 
(1.977) 
 28.38*** 
(1.919) 
27.59*** 
(1.911) 
 23.75*** 
(4.369) 
30.85*** 
(4.771) 
 24.30*** 
(5.184) 
33.04*** 
(3.972) 
 26.51*** 
(1.826) 
27.17*** 
(1.782) 
 28.17*** 
(1.785) 
28.6*** 
(1.772) 
N 1,881 1,806  1,459 1,402  296 280  263 249  2,184 2,093  1,727 1,656 
Year dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 0.203 0.241  0.282 0.309  0.258 0.348  0.256 0.463  0.212 0.259  0.27 0.319 
Chi2 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Panel B. Impact of creditor rights on capital ratios of Islamic banks (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) compared to conventional banks (𝛽1) 
             0.176 
(0.286) 
-0.039 
(0.275) 
 0.428 
(0.308) 
0.114 
(0.297) 
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Table 8  
The effect of creditor rights on bank capital ratios: Controlling for Islamic bank windows and the Basel III capital standards   
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
  
Panel A. The impact of creditor rights on bank capital ratios 
 
 
Model # 
Conventional banks  Islamic banks  Full sample 
Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Creditor 
rights (𝛽1) 
0.337** 
(0.170) 
0.398** 
(0.170) 
 0.579*** 
(0.177) 
0.564*** 
(0.188) 
 0.831* 
(0.497) 
0.299 
(0.526) 
 0.614 
(0.530) 
-0.199 
(0.570) 
 0.349** 
(0.169) 
0.426** 
(0.167) 
 0.638*** 
(0.178) 
0.614*** 
(0.185) 
Size -0.616*** 
(0.095) 
-0.647*** 
(0.094) 
 -0.797*** 
(0.087) 
-0.799*** 
(0.090) 
 -1.298*** 
(0.356) 
-1.672*** 
(0.329) 
 -1.738*** 
(0.409) 
-2.154*** 
(0.353) 
 -0.636*** 
(0.092) 
-0.681*** 
(0.091) 
 -0.859*** 
(0.089) 
-0.874*** 
(0.091) 
Profitability 0.109** 
(0.046) 
0.102** 
(0.046) 
 0.203*** 
(0.057) 
0.202*** 
(0.058) 
 0.233*** 
(0.081) 
0.198*** 
(0.068) 
 0.383*** 
(0.074) 
0.334*** 
(0.071) 
 0.112*** 
(0.042) 
0.099** 
(0.041) 
 0.219*** 
(0.049) 
0.21*** 
(0.049) 
Risk -0.043*** 
(0.009) 
-0.047*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.033*** 
(0.010) 
-0.036*** 
(0.010) 
 -0.008 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
 -0.019 
(0.014) 
-0.006 
(0.016) 
 -0.039*** 
(0.008) 
-0.041*** 
(0.008) 
 -0.032*** 
(0.008) 
-0.033*** 
(0.008) 
Liquidity 0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
 0.006 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
 -0.0008 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
 0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
Tangibility 0.137** 
(0.068) 
0.109 
(0.070) 
 0.056 
(0.077) 
0.008 
(0.078) 
 0.427** 
(0.170) 
0.225 
(0.167) 
 0.521*** 
(0.177) 
0.339* 
(0.178) 
 0.173*** 
(0.063) 
0.136** 
(0.065) 
 0.137* 
(0.074) 
0.089 
(0.075) 
Governance 0.866*** 
(0.287) 
0.820*** 
(0.290) 
 1.275*** 
(0.237) 
1.291*** 
(0.255) 
 1.8*** 
(0.554) 
1.773*** 
(0.517) 
 2.218*** 
(0.603) 
2.181*** 
(0.621) 
 0.938*** 
(0.255) 
0.844*** 
(0.255) 
 1.377*** 
(0.220) 
1.284*** 
(0.230) 
Basel III -1.988*** 
(0.382) 
-2.064*** 
(0.401) 
 -0.38 
(0.315) 
-0.429 
(0.317) 
 -0.932** 
(0.429) 
-1.21** 
(0.480) 
 -1.309** 
(0.565) 
-1.308* 
(0.668) 
 -1.845*** 
(0.336) 
-1.937*** 
(0.349) 
 -0.574** 
(0.289) 
-0.625** 
(0.299) 
Window       0.371 
(1.166) 
0.694 
(0.978) 
 -0.723 
(1.214) 
-0.036 
(1.073) 
 1.478** 
(0.668) 
1.731*** 
(0.619) 
 0.085 
(0.677) 
0.453 
(0.644) 
GDP growth  -0.044* 
(0.025) 
  -0.019 
(0.021) 
  -0.046 
(0.055) 
  -0.022 
(0.071) 
  -0.044* 
(0.023) 
  -0.025 
(0.022) 
Inflation  -0.02 
(0.013) 
  -0.008 
(0.011) 
  -0.061** 
(0.028) 
  -0.057** 
(0.025) 
  -0.02* 
(0.011) 
  -0.014 
(0.010) 
Oil  0.05*** 
(0.012) 
  0.02 
(0.014) 
  0.143*** 
(0.025) 
  0.152*** 
(0.025) 
  0.063*** 
(0.012) 
  0.046*** 
(0.014) 
Mineral  0.178** 
(0.077) 
  0.211** 
(0.102) 
  0.282** 
(0.140) 
  0.214* 
(0.117) 
  0.181** 
(0.076) 
  0.211** 
(0.088) 
Islamic             -1.246 
(1.222) 
-0.964 
(1.240) 
 1.015 
(1.258) 
1.353 
(1.239) 
Creditor rights 
× Lerner (𝛽3) 
            0.336 
(0.493) 
-0.036 
(0.494) 
 -0.354 
(0.541) 
-0.743 
(0.526) 
Constant 28.04*** 
(1.630) 
28.58*** 
(1.598) 
 26.87*** 
(1.614) 
26.96*** 
(1.669) 
 34.15*** 
(5.518) 
39.47*** 
(5.070) 
 40.28*** 
(6.295) 
46.11*** 
(5.207) 
 28.01*** 
(1.534) 
28.59*** 
(1.503) 
 27.62*** 
(1.559) 
27.72*** 
(1.589) 
N 2,915 2,806  3,342 3,211  427 405  382 361  3,342 3,211  2,489 2,386 
Year dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 0.18 0.23  0.226 0.268  0.24 0.4  0.224 0.401  0.19 0.249  0.222 0.284 
Chi2 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Panel B. Impact of creditor rights on capital ratios of Islamic banks (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) compared to conventional banks (𝛽1) 
             0.685 
(0.459) 
0.39 
(0.467) 
 0.284 
(0.512) 
-0.129 
(0.498) 
34 
   
Table 9  
Adjusted Lerner index and alternative proxy for religion  
 Conventional banks  Islamic banks  Entire sample 
 Capital adequacy ratio Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio Core capital ratio 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Panel A.1. The effect of market power on the association between creditor rights and bank capital ratios 
Creditor rights (𝛽1) 0.458** 
(0.220) 
0.524** 
(0.219) 
0.690*** 
(0.227) 
0.700*** 
(0.242) 
 0.151 
(0.562) 
-0.0894 
(0.600) 
0.214 
(0.566) 
-0.0879 
(0.694) 
 0.487** 
(0.206) 
0.544*** 
(0.207) 
0.682*** 
(0.213) 
0.638*** 
(0.226) 
Lerner_MKT 1.319 
(0.820) 
1.236 
(0.833) 
0.724 
(0.722) 
0.662 
(0.759) 
 -3.917*** 
(1.459) 
-4.270** 
(1.782) 
-5.456*** 
(1.364) 
-5.793*** 
(1.965) 
 1.055 
(0.743) 
0.967 
(0.756) 
0.431 
(0.609) 
0.329 
(0.638) 
Creditor rights 
× Lerner_MKT (𝛽3) 
-0.566** 
(0.271) 
-0.605** 
(0.276) 
-0.361 
(0.242) 
-0.381 
(0.258) 
 2.81*** 
(0.809) 
2.368** 
(1.157) 
3.161*** 
(0.701) 
2.723** 
(1.085) 
 -0.463* 
(0.246) 
-0.491** 
(0.250) 
-0.253 
(0.204) 
-0.255 
(0.219) 
N 2,082 2,000 1,557 1,493  316 294 282 261  2,398 2,294 1,839 1,754 
Bank & country 
control 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.179 0.23 0.186 0.252  0.372 0.474 0.393 0.525  0.189 0.241 0.196 0.274 
Panel A.2. Impact of creditor rights when market power is high (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) on conventional banks’ (Models 1 to 4), Islamic banks’ (Models 5 to 8), and the entire sample’s (Models 9 to 12) capital 
ratios computed at different values of the adjusted Lerner index 
25thpercentile 0.385* 
(0.209) 
0.445** 
(0.209) 
0.643*** 
(0.219) 
0.651*** 
(0.233) 
 0.514 
(0.552) 
0.218 
(0.591) 
0.622 
(0.581) 
0.264 
(0.701) 
 0.427** 
(0.197) 
0.481** 
(0.199) 
0.649*** 
(0.208) 
0.605*** 
(0.220) 
50thpercentile 0.319 
(0.205) 
0.375 
(0.205) 
0.602*** 
(0.215) 
0.607*** 
(0.229) 
 0.839 
(0.560) 
0.491 
(0.615) 
0.988 
(0.606) 
0.579 
(0.730) 
 0.374* 
(0.194) 
0.424** 
(0.197) 
0.62*** 
(0.206) 
0.576*** 
(0.218) 
75thpercentile 0.257 
(0.205) 
0.309 
(0.206) 
0.562*** 
(0.216) 
0.565** 
(0.229) 
 1.147** 
(0.582) 
0.75 
(0.661) 
1.334** 
(0.639) 
0.877 
(0.776) 
 0.323* 
(0.195) 
0.37* 
(0.198) 
0.592*** 
(0.206) 
0.548** 
(0.219) 
90thpercentile 0.19 
(0.210) 
0.238 
(0.212) 
0.519** 
(0.219) 
0.52** 
(0.233) 
 1.479** 
(0.619) 
1.03 
(0.733) 
1.708** 
(0.682) 
1.199 
(0.842) 
 0.268 
(0.199) 
0.312 
(0.204) 
0.562*** 
(0.210) 
0.512** 
(0.222) 
Panel B.1.  The effect of market power on the association between creditor rights and bank capital ratios: subsample of banks located in countries where religion is very important 
Creditor rights (𝛽1) -0.456 
(0.844) 
-0.957 
(0.900) 
0.357 
(0.759) 
0.103 
(1.095) 
 2.422 
(1.550) 
-1.780** 
(0.805) 
-1.745 
(1.620) 
-0.791 
(1.305) 
 0.0132 
(0.853) 
-0.669 
(0.881) 
0.732 
(0.872) 
-0.434 
(1.093) 
Lerner 0.699 
(0.954) 
0.646 
(0.876) 
0.188 
(1.045) 
0.141 
(1.060) 
 -3.899* 
(2.244) 
-4.727** 
(2.397) 
-5.654* 
(3.051) 
-3.921 
(3.755) 
 0.670 
(1.133) 
0.904 
(1.011) 
0.606 
(1.140) 
0.630 
(1.053) 
Creditor rights 
×  Lerner_MKT (𝛽3) 
-0.306 
(0.773) 
-0.398 
(0.694) 
0.0939 
(0.666) 
0.110 
(0.681) 
 1.113 
(2.074) 
2.155 
(2.061) 
6.041*** 
(2.243) 
1.930 
(3.499) 
 -0.316 
(1.007) 
-0.642 
(0.867) 
-0.191 
(0.865) 
-0.303 
(0.809) 
N 349 349 287 287  85 85 75 75  434 434 362 362 
Bank & country 
control 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.202 0.286 0.232 0.248  0.373 0.703 0.546 0.646  0.135 0.214 0.136 0.213 
Panel B.2. Impact of creditor rights when market power is high (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) on conventional banks’ (Models 1 to 4), Islamic banks’ (Models 5 to 8), and the entire sample’s (Models 9 to 12) capital 
ratios computed at different values of the adjusted Lerner index, in countries where religion is very important 
25thpercentile -0.506 
(0.763) 
-1.022 
(0.843) 
0.373 
(0.707) 
0.121 
(1.074) 
 2.606* 
(1.384) 
-1.201 
(0.721) 
-0.748 
(1.346) 
-0.472 
(1.311) 
 -0.039 
(0.754) 
-0.775 
(0.836) 
0.701 
(0.792) 
-0.484 
(1.085) 
50thpercentile -0.54 
(0.716) 
-1.066 
(0.812) 
0.383 
(0.681) 
0.133 
(1.066) 
 2.728** 
(1.312) 
-1.186 
(0.751) 
-0.081 
(1.193) 
-0.259 
(1.450) 
 -0.074 
(0.703) 
-0.846 
(0.818) 
0.68 
(0.749) 
-0.517 
(1.089) 
75thpercentile -0.572 
(0.679) 
-1.108 
(0.788) 
0.393 
(0.663) 
0.144 
(1.063) 
 2.846** 
(1.277) 
-0.959 
(0.837) 
0.556 
(1.079) 
-0.055 
(1.657) 
 -0.107 
(0.668) 
-0.914 
(0.812) 
0.66 
(0.718) 
-0.549 
(1.100) 
90thpercentile -0.614 
(0.643) 
-1.163 
(0.767) 
0.406 
(0.649) 
0.159 
(1.067) 
 2.998** 
(1.288) 
-0.663 
(1.011) 
1.384 
(0.999) 
0.209 
(1.998) 
 -0.15 
(0.646) 
-1.002 
(0.819) 
0.633 
(0.694) 
-0.591 
(1.125) 
Panel C.1. The effect of market power on the association between creditor rights and bank capital ratios: subsample of banks located in countries where religion is not very important 
Creditor rights (𝛽1) 0.824*** 1.37*** 1.036*** 1.572***  1.613 1.076 1.369 0.812  0.953*** 1.451*** 1.160*** 1.629*** 
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(Continued) 
Notes: In all panels, we only report the coefficient estimates of the creditor rights’ index, the Lerner index, and their interactions to save space. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are 
reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
  
(0.281) (0.277) (0.282) (0.287) (1.178) (1.284) (1.141) (1.477) (0.272) (0.268) (0.269) (0.275) 
Lerner 1.944 
(1.430) 
1.879 
(1.448) 
0.792 
(0.985) 
0.871 
(1.033) 
 -5.004 
(8.193) 
-4.492 
(8.645) 
-13.01* 
(7.162) 
-13.75* 
(7.442) 
 1.868 
(1.398) 
1.963 
(1.418) 
0.599 
(0.944) 
0.795 
(1.003) 
Creditor rights 
×  Lerner_MKT (𝛽3) 
-0.773 
(0.471) 
-0.809* 
(0.473) 
-0.382 
(0.329) 
-0.440 
(0.348) 
 3.194 
(2.990) 
2.850 
(3.210) 
5.698** 
(2.568) 
5.664** 
(2.698) 
 -0.735 
(0.460) 
-0.813* 
(0.463) 
-0.310 
(0.316) 
-0.401 
(0.338) 
N 1,733 1,651 1,270 1,206  231 209 207 186  1,964 1,860 1,477 1,392 
Bank & country 
control 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.2 0.327 0.236 0.392  0.561 0.562 0.545 0.582  0.227 0.347 0.264 0.397 
Panel C.2. Impact of creditor rights when market power is high (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) on conventional banks’ (Models 1 to 4), Islamic banks’ (Models 5 to 8), and the entire sample’s (Models 9 to 12) capital 
ratios computed at different values of the adjusted Lerner index, in countries where religion is not very important 
25thpercentile 0.728*** 
(0.273) 
1.269*** 
(0.268) 
0.988*** 
(0.277) 
1.518*** 
(0.279) 
 2.009** 
(0.986) 
1.429 
(1.068) 
2.076** 
(0.996) 
1.514 
(1.281) 
 0.862*** 
(0.264) 
1.35*** 
(0.258) 
1.122*** 
(0.263) 
1.579*** 
(0.266) 
50thpercentile 0.643** 
(0.277) 
1.18*** 
(0.271) 
0.946*** 
(0.277) 
1.469*** 
(0.277) 
 2.361** 
(0.912) 
1.743* 
(0.977) 
2.703*** 
(0.942) 
2.138* 
(1.162) 
 0.781*** 
(0.267) 
1.26*** 
(0.259) 
1.088*** 
(0.264) 
1.535*** 
(0.264) 
75thpercentile 0.558* 
(0.291) 
1.09*** 
(0.284) 
0.904*** 
(0.282) 
1.42*** 
(0.280) 
 2.715*** 
(0.954) 
2.059** 
(1.010) 
3.336*** 
(0.942) 
2.767** 
(1.111) 
 0.7** 
(0.279) 
1.17*** 
(0.271) 
1.053*** 
(0.268) 
1.491*** 
(0.267) 
90thpercentile 0.47 
(0.313) 
0.999*** 
(0.306) 
0.86*** 
(0.292) 
1.37*** 
(0.289) 
 3.077*** 
(1.103) 
2.381** 
(1.161) 
3.98*** 
(1.082) 
3.407*** 
(1.141) 
 0.616** 
(0.300) 
1.078*** 
(0.292) 
1.018*** 
(0.278) 
1.445*** 
(0.275) 
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Table 10 
Three-bank (C3) concentration ratio as an alternative measure of competition 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
Panel A. Impact of creditor rights in highly concentrated markets (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) on conventional banks’ (Models 1 to 4), Islamic banks’ (Models 5 to 8), and the entire sample’s (Models 9 to 12) capital ratios 
computed at different values of the three-bank (C3) concentration ratio 
 Conventional banks  Islamic banks  Entire sample 
 Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio  Capital adequacy ratio  Core capital ratio 
Model # (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
25thpercentile 0.397** 
(0.191) 
0.417** 
(0.192) 
 0.58*** 
(0.183) 
0.54*** 
(0.192) 
 0.627 
(0.595) 
-0.196 
(0.517) 
 0.551 
(0.666) 
-0.382 
(0.642) 
 0.445** 
(0.179) 
0.439** 
(0.182) 
 0.532*** 
(0.175) 
0.443** 
(0.181) 
50thpercentile 0.382** 
(0.170) 
0.435** 
(0.173) 
 0.544*** 
(0.169) 
0.51*** 
(0.182) 
 0.772 
(0.529) 
0.116 
(0.498) 
 0.66 
(0.585) 
-0.094 
(0.596) 
 0.462*** 
(0.159) 
0.501*** 
(0.163) 
 0.528*** 
(0.159) 
0.486*** 
(0.169) 
75thpercentile 0.351* 
(0.195) 
0.471** 
(0.194) 
 0.471** 
(0.195) 
0.491** 
(0.204) 
 1.06** 
(0.469) 
0.738 
(0.513) 
 0.879* 
(0.491) 
0.482 
(0.558) 
 0.496*** 
(0.178) 
0.625*** 
(0.181) 
 0.522*** 
(0.176) 
0.572*** 
(0.185) 
90thpercentile 0.304 
(0.330) 
0.524 
(0.319) 
 0.364 
(0.316) 
0.488* 
(0.541) 
 1.485** 
(0.593) 
1.655** 
(0.643) 
 1.202** 
(0.579) 
1.331** 
(0.645) 
 0.545* 
(0.302) 
0.807*** 
(0.297) 
 0.513* 
(0.284) 
0.698** 
(0.275) 
N 3,127 3,018  2,271 2,189  445 423  390 369  3,572 3,441  2,661 2,558 
R2 0.196 0.235  0.275 0.307  0.348 0.435  0.354 0.442  0.204 0.242  0.273 0.314 
Panel B.1. Impact of creditor rights in highly concentrated markets (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) on  conventional banks’ (Models 1 to 4), Islamic banks’ (Models 5 to 8), and the entire sample’s (Models 9 to 12) capital ratios 
computed at different values of the three-bank (C3) concentration ratio, in predominately Muslim countries 
25thpercentile 0.346 
(0.331) 
0.322 
(0.357) 
 0.455 
(0.283) 
0.496* 
(0.291) 
 0.378 
(0.839) 
-0.761 
(0.863) 
 -0.069 
(0.805) 
-2.035** 
(0.915) 
 0.338 
(0.303) 
0.349 
(0.325) 
 0.222 
(0.278) 
0.207 
(0.282) 
50thpercentile 0.03 
(0.263) 
0.085 
(0.275) 
 0.15 
(0.243) 
0.274 
(0.259) 
 0.564 
(0.688) 
0.199 
(0.904) 
 0.053 
(0.705) 
-1.231 
(0.772) 
 0.143 
(0.252) 
0.249 
(0.266) 
 0.062 
(0.237) 
0.121 
(0.251) 
75thpercentile -0.323 
(0.283) 
-0.178 
(0.274) 
 -0.19 
(0.285) 
0.026 
(0.294) 
 0.771 
(0.659) 
1.272 
(1.128) 
 0.19 
(0.668) 
-0.334 
(0.883) 
 -0.074 
(0.278) 
0.138 
(0.282) 
 -0.117 
(0.267) 
0.026 
(0.276) 
90thpercentile -0.649* 
(0.378) 
-0.421 
(0.359) 
 0.505 
(0.379) 
-0.203 
(0.377) 
 0.963 
(0.779) 
2.262 
(1.432) 
 0.317 
(0.712) 
0495 
(1.172) 
 -0.275 
(0.363) 
0.035 
(0.363) 
 -0.282 
(0.349) 
-0.062 
(0.343) 
N 1,453 1,392  878 823  177 160  137 120  1,630 1,552  1,015 943 
R2 0.134 0.136  0.222 0.223  0.399 0.424  0.469 0.509  0.145 0.144  0.234 0.235 
Panel B.2. Impact of creditor rights in highly concentrated markets (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) on conventional banks’ (Models 1 to 4), Islamic banks’ (Models 5 to 8), and the entire sample’s (Models 9 to 12) capital ratios 
computed at different values of the three-bank (C3) concentration ratio, in predominantly non-Muslim countries 
25thpercentile 0.666*** 
(0.255) 
0.616** 
(0.272) 
 0.782*** 
(0.263) 
0.659** 
(0.279) 
 1.912** 
(0.777) 
1.097 
(0.845) 
 1.168 
(0.886) 
-0.114 
(1.252) 
 0.789*** 
(0.238) 
0.703*** 
(0.252) 
 0.899*** 
(0.245) 
0.675*** 
(0.257) 
50thpercentile 0.771*** 
(0.251) 
0.749*** 
(0.267) 
 0.862*** 
(0.259) 
0.757*** 
(0.276) 
 2.422*** 
(0.788) 
1.607* 
(0.891) 
 1.539* 
(0.869) 
0.232 
(1.242) 
 0.922*** 
(0.234) 
0.865*** 
(0.248) 
 1.016*** 
(0.242) 
0.81*** 
(0.255) 
75thpercentile 1.042*** 
(0.284) 
1.098*** 
(0.298) 
 1.07*** 
(0.291) 
1.012*** 
(0.306) 
 3.751*** 
(0.968) 
2.938*** 
(1.118) 
 2.507** 
(0.986) 
1.137 
(1.335) 
 1.27*** 
(0.268) 
1.285*** 
(0.281) 
 1.323*** 
(0.277) 
1.163*** 
(0.289) 
90thpercentile 1.461*** 
(0.417) 
1.635*** 
(0.431) 
 1.391*** 
(0.413) 
1.406*** 
(0.727) 
 5.802*** 
(1.479) 
4.991*** 
(1.626) 
 3.999*** 
(1.465) 
2.532 
(1.732) 
 1.807*** 
(0.403) 
1.934*** 
(0.413) 
 1.795*** 
(0.406) 
1.707*** 
(0.416) 
N 1,641 1,593  1,376 1,349  265 260  251 247  1,906 1,853  1,627 1,596 
R2 0.269 0.335  0.301 0.383  0.441 0.509  0.407 0.543  0.285 0.349  0.31 0.409 
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Table 11  
The effect of creditor rights on capital ratios: Controlling for countries’ income and legal origins 
 
 
 
 Conventional banks  Islamic banks  Entire sample 
 Capital 
adequacy 
Core 
capital 
 Capital 
adequacy 
Core 
capital 
 Capital 
adequacy 
Core 
capital 
Model # (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
Panel A. The impact of income level  
Creditor rights ×Poor (β1) 0.214 
(0.223) 
0.391 
(0.252) 
 0.099 
(0.682) 
-0.694 
(0.707) 
 0.281 
(0.209) 
0.294 
(0.231) 
Creditor rights × Rich (β2) 0.384** 
(0.175) 
0.529*** 
(0.189) 
 0.438 
(0.558) 
0.168 
(0.594) 
 0.468*** 
(0.164) 
0.494*** 
(0.173) 
Creditor rights × Poor × Islamic (β′1)         -0.515 
(0.362) 
-0.155 
(0.382) 
Creditor rights × Rich × Islamic (β′2)         -0.347* 
(0.192) 
-0.148 
(0.209) 
Constant 29.15*** 
(1.522) 
30.3*** 
(1.773) 
 38.83*** 
(4.846) 
44.5*** 
(5.142) 
 29.09*** 
(1.424) 
30.58*** 
(1.513) 
N 3,020 2,194  423 369  3,443 2,563 
Bank & country control Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
F-Stat. H0: (β1) = (β2) 2.04 0.89  0.95 5.14**  2.61 1.98 
F-Stat. H0: (β′1) = (β′2)       2.16 0.01 
F-Stat. H0: (β1) = …= (β′2)       16.94*** 8.99** 
R2 0.2222 0.2738  0.3966 0.4252  0.2385 0.2884 
Wald Chi2 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
Panel B. The impact of legal origins  
Creditor rights × English (β1) 0.478*** 
(0.171) 
0.537*** 
(0.188) 
 0.486 
(0.561) 
0.263 
(0.604) 
 0.584*** 
(0.161) 
0.532*** 
(0.170) 
Creditor rights × French (β2) 0.153 
(0.206) 
0.450* 
(0.249) 
 0.369 
(0.674) 
0.52 
(0.686) 
 0.285 
(0.192) 
0.446** 
(0.226) 
Creditor rights × German (β3) 0.134 
(0.269) 
0.766** 
(0.380) 
 0.139 
(0.541) 
dropped  0.163 
(0.255) 
0.598* 
(0.323) 
Creditor rights ×   English × Islamic 
(β′1)  
      -0.533*** 
(0.204) 
-0.239 
(0.221) 
Creditor rights × French × Islamic (β′2)       -0.172 
(0.292) 
0.281 
(0.346) 
Creditor rights × German × Islamic (β′3)       0.529*** 
(0.195) 
dropped 
Constant 29.63*** 
(1.547) 
30.06*** 
(1.713) 
 38.91*** 
(4.985) 
43.80*** 
(5.025) 
 29.37*** 
(1.449) 
30.17*** 
(1.470) 
N 3,020 2,194  423 369  3,443 2,563 
Bank & country control Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
F-Stat. H0: (β1) = (β2) = (β3) 7.75** 0.91  0.67 0.78  7.7** 0.48 
F-Stat. H0: (β′1) = (β′2) = (β′3)       15.07*** 1.93 
F-Stat. H0: (β1) = …= (β′3)       27.13*** 12.31** 
R2 0.2096 0.2679  0.3786 0.3856  0.2254 0.2807 
Wald Chi2 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Notes: We only report the coefficient estimates of interaction terms between the creditor rights’ index and different dummy variables 
representing the countries’ income level (Panel A) and legal origins (Panel B) to save space. Standard errors are clustered at the bank 
level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 12  
The effect of creditor rights on capital ratios: Controlling for bank experience and economic fluctuations 
 
 
 
Notes: We only report the coefficient estimates of interaction terms between the creditor rights’ index and different variables 
representing bank age (Panel A) and economic fluctuations (Panel B) to save space. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level 
and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
 Conventional banks  Islamic banks  Entire sample 
 Capital 
adequacy 
Core 
capital 
 Capital 
adequacy 
Core 
capital 
 Capital 
adequacy 
Core 
capital 
Model # (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
Panel A. The impact of bank experience   
Creditor rights × Young (β1) 0.02 
(0.263) 
0.118 
(0.307) 
 1.173 
(0.765) 
1.043 
(0.868) 
 0.073 
(0.265) 
-0.004 
(0.284) 
Creditor rights × Middle (β2) 0.16 
(0.266) 
0.019 
(0.292) 
 0.816 
(0.842) 
0.936 
(1.074) 
 0.234 
(0.263) 
-0.01 
(0.291) 
Creditor rights  × Mature (β3) 0.46*** 
(0.178) 
0.612*** 
(0.189) 
 0.137 
(0.679) 
0.063 
(0.855) 
 0.536*** 
(0.171) 
0.594*** 
(0.182) 
Creditor rights × Young × Islamic (β′1)       0.892** 
(0.442) 
1.137** 
(0.510) 
Creditor rights × Middle × Islamic (β′2)       0.382 
(0.436) 
1.117* 
(0.607) 
Creditor rights × Mature × Islamic (β′3)       -0.752*** 
(0.251) 
-0.419 
(0.280) 
Constant 29.59*** 
(1.544) 
30.94*** 
(1.682) 
 42.05*** 
(7.093) 
49.68*** 
(8.520) 
 29.7*** 
(1.553) 
31.72*** 
(1.692) 
N 2,869 2,099  419 365  3,288 2,464 
Bank & country control Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
F-Stat. H0: (β1) = (β2) = (β3) 5.96* 10.41***  5.59* 3.42  5.62* 11.62*** 
F-Stat. H0: (β′1) = (β′2) = (β′3)       12.01*** 9.48*** 
F-Stat. H0: (β1) = …= (β′3)       2975*** 24.17*** 
R2 0.2438 0.3020  0.4136 0.4094  0.2523 0.2982 
Wald Chi2 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
Panel B. The impact of economic fluctuations  
Creditor rights ×Before (β1) 0.29* 
(0.172) 
0.017 
(0.573) 
 -0.095 
(0.629) 
0.371 
(0.861) 
 0.369** 
(0.161) 
0.197 
(0.170) 
Creditor rights × During (β2) 0.263 
(0.173) 
0.181 
(0.564) 
 -0.008 
(0.613) 
0.361 
(0.865) 
 0.346** 
(0.161) 
0.254 
(0.170) 
Creditor rights × After (β3) 0.359* 
(0.184) 
0.637*** 
(0.188) 
 0.655 
(0.540) 
0.423 
(0.622) 
 0.449*** 
(0.172) 
0.615*** 
(0.173) 
Creditor rights × Before × Islamic (β′1)       -0.468* 
(0.273) 
0.117 
(0.332) 
Creditor rights × During × Islamic (β′2)       -0.365* 
(0.211) 
0.009 
(0.230) 
Creditor rights × After × Islamic (β′3)       -0.261 
(0.177) 
-0.184 
(0.195) 
Constant 26.87*** 
(1.484) 
29.64*** 
(1.741) 
 33.99*** 
(4.630) 
37.24*** 
(5.399) 
 26.84*** 
(1.382) 
29.11*** 
(1.455) 
N 3,020 2,194  423 369  3,443  2,563 
Bank & country control Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
F-Stat. H0: (β1) = (β2) = (β3) 1.41 29.62***  6.24** 4.39  1.64 32.49*** 
F-Stat. H0: (β′1) = (β′2) = (β′3)       0.75 1.34 
F-Stat. H0: (β1) = …= (β′3)       11.14** 34.07*** 
R2 0.2161 0.2527  0.3676 0.3629  0.2316 0.2703 
Wald Chi2 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
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Table 13  
Credtior rights and bank capital adequacy ratio: Adressing endogeneity and self-selection bias 
Panel A. Baseline results  
 Conventional banks  Islamic banks  Entire sample 
 IV approach Heckman  IV approach Heckman  IV approach Heckman 
 First stage 2SLS GMM Selection 
equation 
Outcome 
equation 
 First stage 2SLS GMM Selection 
equation 
Outcome 
equation 
 First 
stage 
2SLS GMM Selection 
equation 
Outcome 
equation 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Profitability  0.894*** 
(0.130) 
0.886*** 
(0.125) 
 0.332*** 
(0.0914) 
  0.391* 
(0.202) 
0.36* 
(0.200) 
 0.139 
(0.134) 
  0.746*** 
(0.102) 
0.735*** 
(0.099) 
 0.261*** 
(0.088) 
Profitability (-2) 0.362*** 
(0.035) 
  0.243*** 
(0.017) 
  0.346*** 
(0.124) 
  0.131*** 
(0.037) 
  0.398*** 
(0.041) 
  0.222*** 
(0.015) 
 
ROA industry (-1) 0.303*** 
(0.041) 
  0.237*** 
(0.025) 
  0.251** 
(0.127) 
  0.272*** 
(0.082) 
  0.299*** 
(0.039) 
  0.245*** 
(0.023) 
 
Creditor rights -0.019 
(0.036) 
0.6*** 
(0.107) 
0.596*** 
(0.106) 
-0.118*** 
(0.027) 
0.674*** 
(0.217) 
 -0.565*** 
(0.186) 
0.681* 
(0.347) 
0.645* 
(0.346) 
-0.241** 
(0.107) 
0.494 
(0.571) 
 -0.035 
(0.033) 
0.759*** 
(0.106) 
0.754*** 
(0.105) 
-0.11*** 
(0.025) 
0.735*** 
(0.201) 
Size -0.002 
(0.015) 
-0.549*** 
(0.047) 
-0.596*** 
(0.106) 
0.058*** 
(0.015) 
-0.589*** 
(0.092) 
 0.584** 
(0.228) 
-1.786*** 
(0.269) 
-1.766*** 
(0.269) 
0.345*** 
(0.089) 
-1.612*** 
(0.394) 
 0.02 
(0.018) 
-0.73*** 
(0.045) 
-0.731*** 
(0.045) 
0.072*** 
(0.015) 
-0.618*** 
(0.090) 
Risk 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.058*** 
(0.005) 
-0.058*** 
(0.005) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.056*** 
(0.009) 
 0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.05*** 
(0.015) 
-0.05*** 
(0.015) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.048** 
(0.022) 
 0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.061*** 
(0.006) 
-0.061*** 
(0.006) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.06*** 
(0.00816) 
Liquidity 0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.02*** 
(0.005) 
0.02*** 
(0.005) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.0237*** 
(0.006) 
 0.002 
(0.007) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.01** 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
Tangibility -0.086*** 
(0.031) 
0.242*** 
(0.062) 
0.241*** 
(0.062) 
-0.061*** 
(0.016) 
0.229** 
(0.100) 
 -0.244 
(0.178) 
0.284* 
(0.168) 
0.275 
(0.168) 
-0.024 
(0.046) 
0.195 
(0.291) 
 -0.086** 
(0.034) 
0.362*** 
(0.060) 
0.362*** 
(0.060) 
-0.063*** 
(0.015) 
0.259*** 
(0.091) 
Governance -0.001 
(0.049) 
1.344*** 
(0.126) 
1.343*** 
(0.126) 
0.193*** 
(0.045) 
1.277*** 
(0.240) 
 -0.304 
(0.212) 
2.334*** 
(0.343) 
2.298*** 
(0.341) 
-0.016 
(0.134) 
2.231*** 
(0.636) 
 -0.02 
(0.049) 
1.736*** 
(0.116) 
1.735*** 
(0.116) 
0.182*** 
(0.040) 
1.286*** 
(0.221) 
GDP growth 0.025*** 
(0.008) 
-0.17*** 
(0.029) 
-0.17*** 
(0.029) 
0.076*** 
(0.009) 
-0.198*** 
(0.037) 
 0.001 
(0.051) 
-0.015 
(0.075) 
-0.013 
(0.075) 
0.043 
(0.030) 
-0.015 
(0.067) 
 0.018* 
(0.010) 
-0.11*** 
(0.031) 
-0.11*** 
(0.031) 
0.072*** 
(0.009) 
-0.188*** 
(0.034) 
Inflation -0.006 
(0.009) 
0.01 
(0.018) 
0.009 
(0.018) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
-0.0017 
(0.022) 
 -0.044 
(0.033) 
-0.061 
(0.042) 
-0.068 
(0.042) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
-0.071 
(0.043) 
 -0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
-0.02 
(0.016) 
0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.020) 
Oil 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.03*** 
(0.006) 
0.03*** 
(0.006) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
 0.015 
(0.013) 
0.136*** 
(0.018) 
0.136*** 
(0.018) 
-0.017*** 
(0.007) 
0.145*** 
(0.027) 
 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.055*** 
(0.006) 
0.056*** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.044*** 
(0.010) 
Mineral 0.016** 
(0.008) 
0.245*** 
(0.073) 
0.244*** 
(0.073) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.254* 
(0.143) 
 0.06 
(0.102) 
0.939*** 
(0.281) 
0.891*** 
(0.278) 
0.206 
(0.126) 
0.982*** 
(0.242) 
 0.022** 
(0.009) 
0.832*** 
(0.085) 
0.832*** 
(0.085) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.275* 
(0.156) 
Inverse Mills     -0.921*** 
(0.282) 
     -0.133 
(0.622) 
     -0.981*** 
(0.261) 
Constant -0.39 
(0.307) 
25.43*** 
(0.969) 
25.45*** 
(0.964) 
-1.882*** 
(0.297) 
26.76*** 
(1.676) 
 -7.93*** 
(2.961) 
41.18*** 
(3.664) 
40.98*** 
(3.661) 
-6;409*** 
(1.335) 
40.37*** 
(5.897) 
 -0.539 
(0.393) 
25.29*** 
(0.968) 
25.34*** 
(0.961) 
-2.176*** 
(0.277) 
27.08*** 
(1.576) 
N 2,482 2,482 2,482 3,308 2,482  312 312 312 384 312  2,794 2,121 2,121 3,690 2,793 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.252 0.253  0.28   0.461 0.465  0.477   0.352 0.353  0.285 
Chi2    0.00***      0.00***      0.00***  
Han. J stat. (Chi2)  0.058 0.053     1.462 1.462     0.173 0.173   
Han. J stat. (p-value)  0.818 0.818     0.227 0.227     0.678 0.678   
Kleibergen-Paap 
Wald F test 
 103.01*** 103.01***     5.51*** 5.51***     71.84*** 71.88***   
Panel B. The effect of market power on the association between creditor rights and bank capital adequacy ratio: Addressing endogeneity and self-selection bias 
Creditor rights (𝛽
1
)  0.53*** 
(0.168) 
0.538*** 
(0.167) 
 0.683*** 
(0.260) 
  0.18 
(0.334) 
0.25 
(0.156) 
 0.109 
(0.523) 
  0.592*** 
(0.137) 
0.608*** 
(0.136) 
 0.682*** 
(0.232) 
Lerner  -1.761 
(1.479) 
-1.779 
(1.479) 
 -0.62 
(1.567) 
  -6.49*** 
(1.855) 
-6.426*** 
(1.853) 
 -6.484** 
(2.456) 
  -1.954* 
(1.029) 
-1.951* 
(1.029) 
 -1.363 
(1.258) 
Creditor rights 
× Lerner (𝛽3) 
 0.415 
(0.492) 
0.421 
(0.492) 
 0.043 
(0.519) 
  3.401*** 
(0.712) 
3.338*** 
(0.709) 
 3.394*** 
(0.951) 
  0.502 
(0.343) 
0.5 
(0.343) 
 0.313 
(0.419) 
N  1,611 1,611  1,611   229 229  229   1,840 1,840  1,840 
Bank & country 
control 
 Yes Yes  Yes   Yes Yes  Yes   Yes Yes  Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes  Yes   Yes Yes  Yes   Yes Yes  Yes 
R2  0.264 0.262  0.306   0.574 0.573  0.574   0.292 0.29  0.318 
Han. J stat. (Chi2)  0.141 0.141     0.994 0.994     0.727 0.727   
Han. J stat. (p-value)  0.707 0.707     0.319 0.319     0.394 0.394   
Kleibergen-Paap 
Wald F test 
 106.95*** 106.98***     10.03*** 10.03***     117.76*** 117.76***   
Panel C. Impact of creditor rights when market power is high (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) on conventional banks’ (Models 2, 3 and 5), Islamic banks’ (Models 7, 8 and 10) and the entire sample’s (Models 12, 13 and 15) capital adequacy ratio 
computed at different values of the Lerner index 
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Notes: In all panels, the dependent variable is capital adequacy ratio. In panel B, we only report the coefficient estimates of the creditor rights’ index, the Lerner index, and their interactions to save space. Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
 
.
25th percentile  0.574*** 
(0.146) 
0.583*** 
(0.144) 
 0.687*** 
(0.253) 
  0.529 
(0.341) 
0.518 
(0.341) 
 0.492 
(0.563) 
  0.645*** 
(0.129) 
0.661*** 
(0.127) 
 0.715*** 
(0.232) 
50th percentile  0.628*** 
(0.142) 
0.637*** 
(0.140) 
 0.693*** 
(0.260) 
  0.98*** 
(0.371) 
0.951** 
(0.370) 
 1.022 
(0.645) 
  0.71** 
(0.132) 
0.726*** 
(0.130) 
 0.756*** 
(0.244) 
75th percentile   0.674*** 
(0.160) 
0.684*** 
(0.158) 
 0.698** 
(0.280) 
  1.355*** 
(0.412) 
1.319*** 
(0.410) 
 1.356* 
(0.707) 
  0.765*** 
(0.145) 
0.781*** 
(0.144) 
 0.79*** 
(0.262) 
90th percentile  0.723*** 
(0.195) 
0.734*** 
(0.193) 
 0.703** 
(0.312) 
  1.762*** 
(0.467) 
1.718*** 
(0.465) 
 1.758** 
(0.791) 
  0.825*** 
(0.168) 
0.841*** 
(0.167) 
 0.828*** 
(0.290) 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1 
Number of banks and percentage of reported observations in each country. CB = conventional bank. IB = Islamic bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country  CBs.  N obs. 
(%) 
IBs.  N obs. 
(%) 
Country  CBs.  N obs. 
(%) 
IBs.  N obs. 
(%) 
Albania  11 54.4 1 33.3 Pakistan  28 30 8 30 
Algeria 16 67.5 2 66.7 Saudi Arabia  8 100 4 66.7 
Bangladesh  32 88.1 7 94.3 Senegal 12 70.5 1 66.7 
Egypt  31 71.4 3 73.3 Singapore  22 36.4 1 46.7 
Indonesia  81 65.1 10 37.3 South Africa  26 37.9 1 66.7 
Iran . . 15 60.9 Syria 11 40 2 40 
Jordan  11 86.7 3 73.3 Tunisia  16 69.6 2 60 
Kenya  39 62 2 30 Turkey  41 47.6 4 43.3 
Kuwait  6 83.3 7 51.4 UAE 19 78.2 9 53.3 
Lebanon  53 52.3 4 30 UK 167 52 4 51.7 
Malaysia 35 73.5 18 49.2 Yemen 6 40 4 68.3 
Mauritania 9 60.7 1 100      
 
Table A.2 
Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in our analysis  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) VIF 
Capital adequacy ratio (1)                
Core capital ratio (2) 0.919*               
Creditor rights (3) 0.059* 0.034*             1.21 
Lerner index (4) -0.014 -0.008 -0.033*            1.03 
Size (5) -0.237* -0.261* 0.049* 0.04*           1.4 
Profitability  (6) 0.173* 0.188* -0.064* 0.04* 0.073*          1.12 
Risk (7) -0.267* -0.254* -0.199* 0.036* 0.064* 0.1*         1.36 
Liquidity (8) 0.307* 0.289* 0.162* -0.029 -0.257* -0.051* -0.414*        1.42 
Tangibility (9) 0.108* 0.11* -0.095* -0.02 -0.328* -0.132* 0.045* 0.027*       1.18 
Governance (10) 0.144* 0.219* -0.253* 0.072* 0.159* 0.09* 0.107* -0.07* -0.028*      1.35 
GDP growth (11) -0.057* -0.025 -0.185* 0.037* -0.007 0.162* 0.085* -0.094* -0.002* 0.151*     1.14 
Inflation (12) -0.001 0.045 -0.318* 0.003 0.003 0.053* 0.024 -0.053* 0.112* 0.042* 0.082*    1.26 
Oil rent (13) 0.131* 0.195* -0.211* 0.092* 0.269* 0.114* 0.035* -0.064* 0.029* 0.177* 0.086* 0.204*   1.39 
Mineral rent (14) 0.073* 0.075* -0.196* 0.017 -0.125* 0.019 0.034* -0.003 0.17* -0.062* 0.029* 0.028* -0.014  1.10 
This table presents correlations and VIF scores of the different variables used in our analysis. 
* Represents significance at the 1% level  
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Appendix B 
 
 
To compute the Lerner index, we follow Weill (2011) and Meslier et al. (2017) and use a three-input cost-
function specification to estimate bank marginal cost:  
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐶) = 𝛼 + β1 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐴) +
1
2
𝛽2(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴)
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ln(𝑤𝑗)
3
𝑗=1
 
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘 𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑗) 𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑘) + ∑ 𝛿𝑗 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐴) 𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑗) +
3
𝑗=1
3
𝑘=1
3
𝑗=1
 
TC represents total costs (sum of total interest expenses and total non-interest expenses) and TA is total 
assets. We employ three input prices: price of labor, w1; price of capital, w2; and price of funds, w3. The 
price of labor is computed by dividing personal expenses by total assets. The price of capital is computed 
by dividing other operating expenses by total assets. Finally, the price of funds is the ratio of interest 
expenses to total customer deposits. Using all the coefficients from the cost-function equation, we can 
compute the marginal cost by employing the following equation: 
𝑀𝐶 =
𝑇𝐶
𝑇𝐴
(β1 + β1 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐴) + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑙𝑛 (𝑤𝑗)
3
𝑗=1
) 
The country-level Lerner index is thus computed as follows: 
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
 
Price is measured using total revenue (sum of total interest income and total non-interest operating 
income). The Lerner index varies between 0 (highly competitive market/weak market power) and 1 (less 
competitive market/strong market power).  
